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Abstract
The debate between the differences and similarities of public and private sector
organizations has been waged over the last half of the century. A majority of these
scholarly works target the comparison of large corporations and federal government
agencies. Through these comparisons, three different approaches emerge. The generic
approach argues that organizational sector differences are moot and this approach
promotes a generic form of management. The publicness approach argues differences
have become blurred to a point of degrees and that all organizations are public to an
extent. The core differences approach argues that the differences between organizational
sectors are significant. This study aligns itself with the core differences approach and will
make two valuable contributions to the comparative organization literature by
systematically analyzing government, private sector business, and nonprofit organizations
at the local organizational level. This study was conducted by completing 60 semistructured elite interviews of local government, business, and nonprofit organization
leaders, in a direct attempt to investigate seven key differences indicated in the scholarly
literature. The seven noteworthy differences analyzed in this study are the primary
organizational goal, organizational values, personnel procedures, the propensity of
managerial risk taking, organizational formalization, organizational environment, and
monetary performance incentives. This study discovered that distinct sectoral differences
do exist.
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Chapter 1
Give Me Efficiency or Give Me Death.

Introduction
Over two hundred years ago, one of the United States founding fathers, Patrick
Henry, said, "but as for me, give me liberty or give me death" (Henry 1775)! Recently
the reforms of public management have demonstrated an obsession with efficiency. The
authors of the latest reforms, either President Reagan's focus on privatization or Vice
President Al Gore's drive to reinvent government have targeted a more cost effective
government. These reform methods attempt to reduce the role of government in the
delivery of services, or they attempt to mimic the business methods of the private sector
(Gore 1993 and 1995; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Savas 1987). These governmental
reform efforts strongly indicate that Patrick Henry might have been wrong in his pursuit
of liberty, as they stress the predominant importance of the value of government
efficiency above other values such as equity, fairness, and constitutional liberty (Rainey
1997; Sullivan 1987).
This persistent pursuit of efficiency or the desire for government agencies to
become more businesslike (Wilson 1887) raises the highly debated question of
government agency distinctiveness (Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976). The drive to
privatize or to reinvent government agencies in order to become more efficient demands
the need to explore the nature of these different sectors. Hence, if government agencies
are different from private sector enterprise, are these differences simply arbitrary
differences that have no relevant purposes? Moreover, how does the nonprofit sector,
also referred to as the third sector (Clarke 2001; Kearns 1994), differ from government

Apples, Oranges, and Grapefruit 2
agencies and private enterprises? Prior to dismantling the managerial methods employed
by public agencies, perhaps Wallace Sayre's oft-quoted dictum "public and private
management are fundamentally alike in all unimportant respects" (Allison 1980, 383),
should be re-examined.
The difference between government agencies and private enterprises has been
intensely debated (Allison 1980; Appleby 1945; Baldwin 1987; Bozeman 1987;
Buchanan 1975; Kaufman 1981; Moe and Gilmour 1995; Murray 1975; Parker and
Subramaniam 1964; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976; Savas 1987; Wilson 1989).
Despite the numerous empirical attempts to establish an overall accepted theory, the
debate lingers on. Scholars from various fields argue from different vantage points that
are congruent, for the most part, with their own academic backgrounds. Hence, some
scholars outside the discipline of political science submit that the differences between
private and public organizations are moot, and they urge for a generic form of
management that can be utilized effectively in any sector (Baldwin 1987; Fottler 1981;
Parker and Subramaniam 1964). Nevertheless, scholars in sociology and political science
argue that the management of public sector organizations is unique due to inherent
differences between the government sector and the private business sector (Blumenthal
1979; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976; Robertson and Seneviratne 1995; Wilson
1989).
The literature that focuses on the differences between organizational sectors has
often been referred to as comparative research (Parker and Subramaniam 1964; Rainey,
Backoff, and Levine 1976; Scott and Falcone 1998). The majority of comparative studies
have been limited to federal agencies, and some have compared these federal agencies to
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precise private sector counterparts in order to examine fundamental organizational sector
differences and similarities (Bozeman 1987; Kaufman 1981; Rainey and Bozeman 2000;
Wilson 1989). This thesis will break away from the traditional mold of comparative
study by examining the role distinctiveness of local government agencies and local
private businesses. In addition, this study will add an important dynamic to the
contemporary method of comparative research by introducing a comparison between the
organizational sectors including the third sector, the sector of nonprofit organizations.
This technique will produce two important contributions to the comparative
literature. First, this study will focus on the local level of government, where the
government interacts with the people on a daily basis. The local level of government also
accounts for the largest number of government offices and operations (Gabris, Grenell,
and Kaatz 1998; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Whelan 1999). Second, this thesis will
examine the third sector of organizations in relation to the public and private
organizational sectors. This is noteworthy since the reform efforts of privatization and
reinvention are making nonprofit organizations more instrumental in the delivery of
public services (Choudhury and Ahmed 2002; Jackson-Elmoore and Hula 2001;
O'Connell 1996; Whelan 1999). Moreover, it is also paramount to include the third
sector in this comparative analysis due to its growing status in our national economy
(Keams 1994).

Literature Review
The majority of the literature reviewed for this analysis was published within
scholarly journals, academic texts, and other intellectual sources. The organizational
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comparative literature proceeds from Wilson's call for administrative reform in the latter
part of the 1800's to articles written by scholars and some practitioners over 100 years
later, at the dawn of the 21st Century. Through the following pages the incessant debate
will be unfolded.

Comparative Organizational Debate
The scholars involved with this ongoing debate employ three separate approaches.
First, scholars argue that administration and management are generic and organizational
sector is irrelevant. Hence, the sector an administration operates within will have no
legitimate bearing on the ability of the administration to perform effectively (Baldwin
1987; Buchanan 1975; Parker and Subramaniam 1964; Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman
1995). Other scholars who assert this approach advocate the principles of business and
suggest the public sector can be more effective and efficient if government administration
would mimic the behavior of business administration (Savas 1987; Seidenstat 1996;
Wilson 1887).
The second approach indicates that a dimensional blur has occurred between the
existing sectors of organizations. These authors conclude that all organizations are public
to an extent, despite their organizational status as a government agency, private
enterprise, or nonprofit organization. The scholars who affirm this approach concede that
differences do exist to a degree, but these differences are not distinct products of the
organization's sector (Bozeman 1987; Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994; Murray 1975).
The third approach is composed of scholars who argue noteworthy differences are
created by organizational sector. Hence these scholars assert the organizational sector
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causes the organization to be distinctively different from organizations in other sectors.
This approach is comprised of authors that contend the public sector is distinctively
different than the private sector (Allison 1980; Appleby 1945; Brealey, Cooper, and
Habib 1997; Crewson 1997; Fottler 1981; Golembiewski 1985; Kaufman 1981; Moon
1999; Rainey 1997; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976; Scott and Falcone 1988; Wilson
1989). This approach also consists of authors who indicate the nonprofit sector differs
from the public and private sectors (Clarke 2001; Gray 1998; Kearns 1994; Marsden,
Cook, and Kalleberg 1994; O'Connell 1996).
However, even these three separate approaches do not appear to be concrete, as
they contain scholars that have leaned from one approach to another depending on the
topic of their empirical study and the year that these scholars have conducted their
studies. For example, notable scholars such as Rainey have contributed scholarly
literature that lends credence to the generic management approach and also literature that
supports the role of distinctive differences. Nevertheless, it is quite apparent that the three
comparative approaches still endure.
This thesis aligns itself with the core approach, which advocates distinct
differences exist between organizational sectors. The arguments produced by numerous
authors strongly support the presence of notable differences between the organizational
sectors (Appleby 1945; Allison 1980; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976). In addition to
these authors' empirical approaches, the testimonies of public and private management
practitioners (Blumenthal 1979; Rumsfeld 1979) also provide overwhelming support for
the core approach.
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Sector Differences
The comparative organizational literature shows that many significant differences
exist between organizations in diverse sectors. The differences highlighted by these
scholarly works include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Organizational Goal
Organizational Values
Organizational Personnel Procedures
Managerial Risk Taking
Organizational Formalization (Red Tape)
Organizational Environment and Openness (Goldfish Bowl)
Employee Motivation (Performance Incentives)

1. Organizational Goal
The goal of an organization is inherently different according to the sector of the
organization. For the purpose of this research, the term organizational goal refers to the
primary purpose of the organization and the primary functions of the organization. The
private organization's primary function is well documented in the comparative literature.
"Even the most simplistic interpretations of public-private distinctions readily identify
one significant factor: presence or absence of profit motive" (Bozeman 1987, 48).
Hence, the literature contends that the fundamental reason for a private organization to
exist is to generate a profit (Allison 1980; Brealey, Cooper, and Habib 1997; Fottler
1981; Rainey 1997; Seidenstat 1996; Wilson1989). Practitioners also note the
importance of the profit motive within the private sector (Blumenthal 1979; Osborne and
Gaebler 1992; Rumsfeld 1979).
On the other hand, the goal of the public organization is not as concise and not
geared toward making a profit; "whereas business management focuses upon the 'bottom
line' (that is, profits), government management focuses upon the 'top line' (that is,
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constraints)" (Wilson 1989, 115). Thus, the public and private sector organization's
primary reason for being is essentially different. Wilson (1989) strengthened this
argument by stating that there is a widespread expectation that the public sector should
not profit from providing a public service. Nevertheless, Murray (1975) countered by
arguing the private enterprise has more goals than just making a profit and even
contended that government's focus on efficiency indicates the public sector is interested
in profit as well.
The opportunities organizations have to establish their goals also differ between
organizational sectors. Private organizations are able to determine their own missions or
purpose for being. This luxury is not afforded to public organizations. Public
organizations have goals imposed on them by external sources such as the general public,
the executive branch, and the legislative branch (Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976;
Wilson 1989). The legal constraints placed on public agencies limit the ability of public
managers to choose goals for their organizations; these legal constraints serve as checks
and balances for government institutions (Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976).
O'Connell (1996) strongly contends that the duties of the public sector are based
on the government's responsibility to the people. O'Connell admonishes against the
possible attempt of the government to transfer the responsibility for providing
government services to the nonprofit sector concomitantly with the transfer of the
services through the process of privatization. According to O'Connell, "These groups
[nonprofits] are not responsible for the general welfare [of the people]" (O'Connell 1996,

3).
Voluntary organizations represent alternatives, options, experimentation,
supplementation, and leadership, and they can be a vehicle through which the
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government fulfills some of its responsibilities, but it is essential to our clear
grasp of relative roles that on matters involving the general welfare, it is
representative democratic government to which we turn. This does not mean that
government must run every service and program, but that is a secondary
consideration ... Whatever delivery mechanisms we may want to establish for
essential services, they are, nevertheless, a governmental responsibility ... we can
no longer allow our delivery preferences to obscure that these are governmental
responsibilities, Though the activity can be delegated, the responsibility cannot
(O'Connell 1996, 3).

2. Organizational Values
The values of the organization also present a striking sector-related difference
between the three organizational sectors. According to the comparative literature, the
predominant value of the private sector is efficiency (Allison 1980; Bozeman 2002;
Brealey, Cooper, and Habib 1997; Frederickson 1996; Golembiewski 1985; Gore 1993,
1995; Gray 1998; Rainey 1997; Savas 1987; Seidenstat 96; Sullivan 87; Wilson 1989).
Even the practitioner literature indicates the main value of the private sector was
efficiency (Blumenthal 1979). In addition, Gray (1998) cites the private sector's
infatuation with the value of efficiency as one of the pivotal differences between
nonprofit organizations and private enterprises.
The literature is resplendent with many references to the multiple values that
concern public organizations. These values are not only subordinate to the value of
efficiency; rather the values of effectiveness (Golembiewski 1985), accountability
(Bozeman 2002; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976; Sullivan 1987; Wilson 1989),
responsiveness (Fottler 1981; Golembiewski 1985; Rainey 1997; Wilson 1989), equity
(Brealey, Cooper and Habib 1997; Frederickson 1996; Savas 1987; Sullivan 1987;
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Wilson 1989), and fairness (Frederickson 1996; Wilson 1989) all play a pivotal role in
the duties of public agencies.
Hence, the organizational values differ between public and private sector
organizations. The private sector value of choice tends to be efficiency and competitive
services, while public organizations focus on the value of providing equitable service to
various constituents (Allison 1980). According to Bozeman (2002) the value of
efficiency is not always the most important value in public agencies; rather the values of
public interest, due process, and accountability also play significant roles. Similarly,
Golembiewski (1985, 14) notes that public sector organizations have to pay significant
attention to the values of effectiveness, representation, and responsiveness. The pursuit of
these values often requires a sacrifice in efficiency.
Wilson (1989) vehemently argues that the value of efficiency should not be
overestimated within the public sector.
Inefficiency is not the only bureaucratic problem nor is it even the most
important. A perfectly efficient agency could be a monstrous one, swiftly
denying our liberties, economically inflicting injustices, and competently
expropriating our wealth ... The checks and balances of the American
constitutional system reflect our desire to reduce arbitrariness of official rule.
That desire is based squarely on the premise that inefficiency is a small price to
pay for freedom and responsiveness (Wilson 1989, 326).
Moreover, Allison (1980) strongly asserts that an attempt to bring private sector practices
to the public sector to improve sector efficiency will not be very effective. "Improvement
will come not, however, from massive borrowing of specific private management skills
and understandings" (Allison 1980, 397).
In addition, Fottler (1981) argues the difference in values has a major impact on
the organization's ability to function. Fottler attributes the values of an organization as
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one of the most significant institutional differences, as he examined four different
organizational sectors including the government corporation. "My basic proposition is
that there are some apparently significant institutional differences (values, incentives, and
constraints) that differentiate the four organizational prototypes and affect how the
essential functions of management are carried out" (Fottler 1981, 3).
Organizational value differences between public and nonprofit organizations are
also illuminated in the nonprofit literature (Clarke 2001; Kearns 1994; O'Connell 1996).
Kearns (1994) argues that public administrators are more familiar with the concept of
accountability than nonprofit organization leaders. Keams notes that the nonprofit
literature is behind the curve when it comes to the value of accountability as compared to
the public organizational literature. In regards to the notion that nonprofit organizations
are capable of handling the delivery of public services, Kearns identifies the value of
accountability as one of two inhibiting factors. "These two problems might be easily
addressed if we could merely transplant what we know about accountability in the public
sector to the private nonprofit sectors. But, the differences between the two sectors-in
mission, philosophy, structure, and standard operating procedures-are vast" (Kearns
1994, 2).

3. Organizational Personnel Procedures
Another major sectoral difference explicated in the scholarly literature is hiring,
promotion, and termination procedures. The scholarly literature strongly suggests that the
procedures for hiring, promoting, and firing personnel are more formalized in the public
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sector than the private sector (Allison 1980; Bozeman 1987; Rainey 1983; Rainey,
Sanjay, and Bozeman 1995; Scott and Falcone 1998; Wilson 1989).
Wilson (1989) states a business firm can make personnel choices through perfect
freedom, but Congress directs a federal agency on their personnel decisions. Wilson adds
that the legislature determines how many people an organization can hire, when they can
hire them, and what the organization will pay the new employee. Allison (1980) also
identifies personnel constraints as a major difference between the public and private
sectors. Allison notes that private sector businesses have greater levels of leeway in
recruiting, hiring, promoting, and terminating employees than public sector
organizations, despite the presence of bargaining units in each sector (Allison 1980).
Bozeman contends the differences in the personnel procedures of organizations
are one of the most salient differences between the public agency and the private
enterprise. "It is a good bet that many discrepancies between public and private personnel
management can be traced to differences in personnel systems" (Bozeman 1987, 17).
Scott and Falcone (1998) identify more formalization in the hiring and firing processes
for government agencies as a key difference between the public and private organization.
Scott and Falcone note government agencies took four and a half weeks longer than
private laboratories to hire personnel and fourteen weeks longer to terminate employees
(Scott and Falcone, 1998). Rainey (1997) argues that personnel procedures are more
constrained in public organizations than in private enterprises.
The literature also indicates differences in personnel procedures exist between the
public sector and the nonprofit sector. Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg (1994) particularly
note the presence of formalized promotional procedures in public agencies, as a distinct
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difference from the nonprofit or for-profit organization. Hence, the personnel procedures
difference does appear to differentiate the public sector from the nonprofit sector as well.
In addition to the scholarly findings regarding personnel differences, a

management practitioner also notes strong personnel procedural differences between the
public and the private sector (Blumenthal, 1979). Blumenthal expresses the frustration
created by the personnel constraints he endured in the public sector, which were not
extant in private sector organizations.
Out of 120,000 people in the Treasury, I was able to select twenty-five, maybe.
The other 119,975 are outside my control. And not only are they outside my
control in terms of hiring and firing-there also virtually outside my control in
terms of transferring (Blumenthal 1979, 39).

The sectoral personnel difference is one of the key differences the reinvention of
government movement attempted to reform. Under the National Performance Review,
Gore (1993) calls for the reform of public personnel procedures that he believed
generated more harm than good. Gore argues that the federal government personnel
system was simply micromanagement by regulation. He characterizes the system as one
prone to impede efficiency and the effective management of the workforce (Gore 1993).
Gore wants a federal personnel system that would be decentralized, pushing the power to
hire down to the agency level.

4. Managerial Risk Taking
Another notable, yet less common difference indicated by the scholarly literature
is the propensity of the private or public manager to take managerial risks in the
performance of their duties (Bozeman and Kingsley 1998; Fottler 1981; Moon 1999;
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Wilson 1989). Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) examine risk culture in the public and
private organizations, by conducting a survey to identify the presence of a risk culture.
They define risk culture to reflect the propensity of organizational members to take risks.
The authors conclude that little evidence exists to indicate the public sector is more risk
adverse than the private sector.
Among the millions of government employees and thousands of government agencies
there are enough cowering bureaucrats for any of us to either experience them
directly or, perhaps more often, read popular accounts of their sad legacy. But there
is very little evidence of the incidence of risk aversion or that the incidence is greater
in the public than the private sector (Bozeman and Kingsley 1998, 9).

Moon (1999), contrary to Bozeman and Kingsley's (1998) findings, argues that toplevel managers in public organizations are less likely to take risks than managers in
private organizations. Moon defines risk taking as "a strict managerial term discussing
the propensity for organizational change and innovative decision making"(Moon 1999,
3). Moon indicates organizational complexity and formalization are associated with red
tape within an organization, and the presence of red tape affects the risk-taking behavior
of the organization. Likewise, Fottler ( 1981) attributes red tape within public agencies as
a predominant cause of managerial risk taking aversion.

5. Organizational Formalization (Red Tape)
A sectoral feature frequently analyzed in the comparative literature is the presence
of formalization, or the presence of red tape in public organizations. Some authors argue
that the amount of red tape or formalized procedures is more prevalent in public
organizations (Bozeman and Kingsley 1998; Moon 1999; Osborne and Gaebler 1992;
Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976; Wilson 1989). Other authors argue that the presence
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of red tape or formalized rules is not dependant on specific organizational sectors
(Rainey, Sanjay, and Bozeman 1995; Buchanan 1975). Hence, the presence of
formalization in terms of processes and procedures within each of the organizational
sectors also appears to be highly debated. Nevertheless, the testimony of a manager with
experience in both the public and private sector indicates that public sector organizations
at the federal level were more constrained by rules and regulations than larger private
corporations (Blumenthal 1979).
Wilson (1989) argues that public agencies are more constrained by rules and
procedures than private enterprises. A business firm can make purchases according to
internally designed procedures, but a federal agency must abide by a lowest bidder
procedure. Wilson affirms these constraints are not self-initiated.
All these complexities of doing business in or with the government are wellknown to citizens and firms. These complexities in hiring, purchasing,
contracting, and budgeting often are said to be the result of the 'bureaucracy's
love of red tape.' ... These rules have been imposed on the agencies by external
actors, chiefly the legislature (Wilson 1989, 121).
Furthermore, Wilson notes that the procurement process in government is engulfed by the
value of fairness. Wilson observes that Congress values fairness over effectiveness, as
fairness underlies almost every phase of the government procurement procedure.
In reference to red tape, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) state that most government
organizations are driven by their rules and budgets, not their missions. They argue that
the rules that guide government organization were created to control five percent of the
government employees who would become corrupt, but this only frustrates the remaining
ninety-five percent of the employees. These procedures prevent some forms of
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corruption, but they also prevent innovation and obstruct the ability of managers to
effectively manage (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).
Rainey, Sanjay, and Bozeman (1995) compare the presence of red tape in the
public sector and the private sector. The authors note that red tape is an important topic
in government since the National Performance Review (1993) targeted the reduction of
red tape. The authors survey both private and public managers in order to analyze the
manager's perception of red tape within their organizations. They define red tape as,
"rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden
for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules' functional object" (Rainey,
Sanjay, and Bozeman 1995, 2). They conclude that their research did not detect any
increase in organizational formalization or the presence of more red tape in public sector
organizations.
Contrary to the perception that the public sector is more constrained by
procedures and processes, Buchanan (1975) discovers that private organizations are more
formalized. "The finding that this sample of business managers was more structure
conscious than their government counterparts seems surprising given the preponderant
view of the bureaucrat as rule-bound and procedure-conscious throughout" (Buchanan
1975, 435).
Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg (1994) identify the amounts of formalized
extensive regulation imposed on public agencies as one of the most significant
differences between public agencies and the private for-profit or nonprofit organizations.
Moreover, Clarke (2001) argues that nonprofit organizations are more flexible and more
responsive than public organizations. Hence, Clarke indicates that nonprofit
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organizations are less formalized than public organizations. In addition, Clarke indicates
the third sector could provide less regulated services than public agencies.
The potential erosion of accountability. Relying on these indirect, less visible, less
administratively complex nonprofit organizations to implement public policies
offers many attractions to public officials. It may spur less opposition, exhibit
fewer visible costs, and promise greater administrative ease with fewer side
effects and greater emphasis on performance standards than more conventional
and direct government intervention (Clarke 2001, 8).

6. Organizational Environment I Openness
The openness of public organizations and the degree they are accountable to
numerous external actors is well represented in the literature (Allison 1980; Appleby
1945; Fottler 1981; Kaufman 1981; Rainey 1997; Ross 1988; Wilson 1887; Wilson
1989). The literature suggests that public agencies are more open to scrutiny than private
enterprises, and public agencies are responsive to a variety of external sources that are
alien to private enterprises. Woodrow Wilson (1887) notes administration is,
"government in action; the executive; the operative, the most visible side of government,"
(Wilson 1887, 14). Appleby (1945) argues that no other form of an organization is as
accountable to the general public as a public or governmental organization. "No other
institution is so publicly accountable. No action taken or contemplated by the government
of a democracy is immune to public debate, scrutiny, or investigation" (Appleby 1945,
125). Appleby clarifies this statement by stating that administrators entering the public
sector are dumbfounded by the amount of openness in public administration. Appleby
describes the openness of the public sector as one of the key differences between
organizational sectors. Moreover, Appleby decisively concludes "Government is different
because it must take account of all the desires, needs, actions, thoughts, and sentiments of
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140,000,000 people. Government is different because government is politics" (Appleby
1945, 126).
Allison (1980) also notes the openness of the public organization. Allison states,
"Governmental management tends to be more exposed to public scrutiny and to be more
open, while private business management is more private and its processes more internal
and less exposed to public review" (Allison 1980, 387). Allison asserts that the media
play an active role discussing decisions made by the public sector; this type of role for the
media is alien to the private sector. Ross (1988) concurs with Allison by stating one of
the most striking differences between the public and private sectors is the openness the
public manager has to endure. "With the exception of some defense and intelligence
areas, government agencies are almost always much more open than the typical business
corporation. Most corporate deliberations are conducted in closed meetings. The
minutes may be circulated within the corporation, but only a court order could make them
public" (Ross 1988, 30).
Kaufman (1981) describes the effect external forces have on public organizations,
as he observed bureau chiefs performing their duties. Kaufman affirms that public
organizations are constrained by tight congressional oversight in addition to other
environmental forces, including the executive branch, clients, hostile interests,
professional groups, and the media. Kaufman reasons that the extreme oversight public
agency chiefs endure inhibits their ability to control their organizations. "It was when
chiefs wanted to modify things -policy, procedure, capital, or any major feature of their
agencies - that the constraints of programming became salient and inhibiting" (Kaufman
1981, 115).
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Blumenthal (1979) and Rumsfeld (1979) also contribute to the literature, as they
discuss the openness of public organizations from a practitioner's point of view.
Blumenthal (1979) expresses his frustration in dealing with the openness of the job due to
the constant criticism of the press. Blumenthal explains the difficulty of changing your
mind in the public sector.
Another example of how significant it is how you appear to the press-and how
different that is in government as compared to in a corporation-has to do with
the risk of changing your mind. A businessman is entitled and expected to change
his mind, and there's no particular opprobrium attached to that at all ... What
counts in the end is how you come out, not whether you've changed your mind or
not .. .in the government, if you change your mind, you're accused of
inconsistency. That's one reason there's a lot of double-talk in Washington.
(Blumenthal 1979, 37)
Likewise, Rumsfeld (1979) also suggests that changing your mind in the public sector is
a dangerous adventure.
Business is also more forgiving of mistakes. In government, you are operating in
a goldfish bowl. You change your mind or make a blunder, as human beings do,
and it's on the front page of every newspaper. It seems to make people in
government less willing to correct their mistakes. This is in contrast to the way
things happen in a boardroom. There it is expected that one will alter direction as
new information becomes available (Rumsfeld 1979, 90).

7. Employee Motivation (Performance Incentives)
Another common topic in the comparative literature is the use of performance
incentives. These incentives are geared to compensate the employee for the
accomplishment of tasks or for exemplary performance. The ability, or inability, of
public agencies to motivate their employees in this fashion is seen as a distinctive
difference generated by the organizational sector (Brealey, Cooper, and Habib 1997;
Crewson 1997; Fottler 1981; Gore 1993; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976; Rainey,
Sanjay, and Bozeman 1995; Rainey 1997). Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1997) contend
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that the absence of the single yardstick to measure performance, such as profit, inhibits
the ability of government to properly utilize performance incentives.
Gore (1993) wants to create a pay-for-performance mentality instead of the traditional
General Schedule pay system in the Federal Government. This mentality would link
performance with economic incentives, which he contends would ultimately improve the
performance of the government worker. Gore argues the federal pay system is currently
unable to provide economic bonuses for exemplary service.
Contrary to the desires of Gore (1993) and government reinvention, Crewson argues
that adopting the pay-for-performance mentality in the public sector might have grave
implications. Crewson (1997) discovers in his research that public employees were more
committed to their jobs than private sector employees. Crewson investigates the
differences in the motivation of public and private sector employees and discovered
distinct differences. Crewson asserts this sectoral characteristic is significant since
misunderstanding what motivates the public employee may have dire implications on the
public service ethos.
The concept of performance incentives also generates distinct barriers between
nonprofit and public organizations. Clarke (2001) notes that one benefit of utilizing the
nonprofit organization in the provision of government services was the ability to
emphasize performance standards more in nonprofit organizations than in government
agencies. Nevertheless, Gray (1998) concedes that nonprofit organizations are not
capable of producing pay-for-performance incentives, such as stock options, like the
private sector can provide.
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Practitioner Opinions of Extant Differences
In addition to the seven proceeding differences, the direct testimony of managers
that have worked in two of these sectors adds credence to the existence of distinct
sectoral differences. The testimony of these practitioners provides invaluable knowledge
direct from the proverbial horse's mouth that public agencies are inherently different
from private enterprises. These inherent differences may include the seven previously
discussed differences, and they might include pertinent differences this thesis has not
analyzed. The scholarly literature makes reference to the opinions of the organizational
manager (Allison 1980; Rainey 1981; Ross 1988). In addition, some of the practitioners
contribute to the literature by providing direct testimony themselves (Blumenthal 1979;
Rumsfeld 1979).
Allison, when identifying reported sector differences, refers to the testimony of
managers who have managed in both sectors,
one powerful piece of evidence in the debate between those that emphasize
'similarities' and those who underline 'differences' is the nearly unanimous
conclusion of individuals who have been general managers in both business and
government ... All judge public management different from private managementand harder (Allison 1980, 386-387).

Moreover, Rainey also notes that many managers who have worked in both sectors
recognize distinct differences between government agencies and private enterprises
(Rainey 1997).
Blumenthal (1979) practiced management as both the Secretary of the United
States Treasury and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for the Bendix Corporation. In a
personal interview on the differences and similarities concerning managing a public
organization and a private organization, Blumenthal confirms the scholarly findings of
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Allison (1980) when he notes that directing a public agency is different and more
complicated than managing a private sector business. Blumenthal concludes that some of
the management principles are the same for both the public and private sector, but
"Business is simple to succeed in if you follow a few simple rules. Government is harder"
(Blumenthal 1979, 48).
Rumsfeld (1979) has also worked in both the private and public sector. In 1979,
Rumsfeld was employed as the CEO of G.D. Searle & Co. Prior to this position,
Rumsfeld was actively employed in the public sector most recently serving as the
Secretary of Defense. Similar to Blumenthal, Rumsfeld also perceives differences
between private and public sector management. However, he also notes extensive
government regulation of the private sector. Rumsfeld describes government's role in the
private sector as much more than an umpire overseeing the game, but an active
participant in business that costs the private sector more than it benefits society.
Additionally, Rumsfeld notes that the techniques of management are not readily
transferable between the public and private sector.
But it's not clear to me that skills are readily transferable between business and
government. I've heard executives who have been successful in the private sector
say: 'I want to get into government.' But there's no particular reason why a
successful businessman should be successful in government--or the reverse
(Rumsfeld 1979, 94).
Ross (1988) compares public management with private sector management from a
manager's point of view. Ross states that appointees spend an average of less than two
years in the top spots of government and often leave frustrated by a web of irrationality.
Ross affirms that there are fundamental differences between public and private
management.

Apples, Oranges, and Grapefruit 22
Business executives who come to Washington with the belief that all government
needs to function more effectively is a good dose of sound business leadership
coupled with the experience learned in a competitive marketplace are destined to
be shocked, confused, and finally angered (Ross 1988, 30).

Literature Review Conclusion
The comparative organizational research literature illuminates three scholarly
approaches. One approach emphasizes that the concept of administration is generic and
argues that noteworthy sectoral differences are lacking. The next approach argues that a
blurring of the sectors has occurred or that all organizations are dimensionally public.
The final approach, referred to as the core differences approach, argues that significant
and distinct differences separate the public and private sector. This thesis aligns itself
with the core differences approach.
The literature illuminates seven noteworthy differences that divide the public and
private sector. Moreover, some of these differences have also been demonstrated to
divide the nonprofit sector from the public or private sector. These seven differences
present a motive to reform the public sector such as the presence of red tape or extreme
formalization in the public sector and the constraining personnel procedures utilized
within the public sector. Yet, these seven differences also present potentially impassable
barriers that may inhibit the ability of government reform efforts, in the form of
organizational goals, organizational values, and the degrees of openness within the public
sector.
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Research Focus and Hypotheses
The importance of comparing organizational sectors cannot be overestimated
since the findings of an objective comparison could challenge fundamental assumptions
made by organizational managers (Bozeman 2000, 3). The comparative study of
organizations is very valuable in the field of public administration, since it rests at the
root of organizational models and the proper way to administer them. "It also raises
important questions on the relation between goals, values and administration" (Parker and
Subramaniam 1964, 358). Additionally, the study of the sectoral differences also has a
direct impact on the study of public administration and business administration. The
distinctiveness of the sectors is what necessitates two schools of thought, beyond a
generic management approach to education that would only be capable of teaching
students a limited curriculum. This generic form of education would fail to address the
peculiarities of private business or public administration (Rainey, Backoff, and Levine
1976).
This thesis is entitled apples, oranges, and grapefruit since all three fruits exhibit
similarities and differences that mimic the hypotheses for this study. Apples, oranges,
and grapefruit are all classified as fruits; all have exterior skins, delicious meat in the
middle, juice, and seeds. However, their numerous similarities do not make all three
fruits the same, as a simple investigation would conclude these three fruits taste, smell,
feel, and look different.
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Hypothesis 1
The primary organizational goal ofpublic agencies will be distinctively different from the
goal ofprivate enterprises, but only marginally different from the primary goal of
nonprofit organizations.
In this thesis, the term primary organizational goal refers to the main objective of
an organization according to the perception of the organizational manager. This
hypothesis will be measured by evaluating the perceptions of the interviewed
organizational managers from the public, private, and nonprofit organizations. The
solicited responses will be categorized in an effort to determine if the primary goal of
public agencies differs from the primary goal of private enterprises and the primary goal
of nonprofit organizations. This thesis expects to discover that the primary goal of public
agencies will be dramatically different from the primary goal of private enterprises.
Nevertheless, the literature does not produce clear evidence to suggest a vast degree of
separation between the primary goal of public and nonprofit organizations. Hence, this
thesis conservatively predicts these two sectors will only be marginally different in
regards to the primary goal of their organization.

Hypothesis 2
Public agencies are more likely than private enterprises or nonprofit organizations to
emphasize the values ofaccountability and responsiveness.
Within this thesis only the organizational values of accountability,
responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency will be considered for comparison. Hence
the importance of organizational values such as fairness and equity will not be evaluatedi.
The literature indicates that organizational values are a key difference between the three
sectors. This thesis posits that the organizational managers of each sector will perceive
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notable differences in the importance of each value within their organization. The
perceptions of these managers will be measured by analyzing how the respondents rank
each of these organizational values in importance.

Hypothesis 3
Public agency personnel procedures related to hiring, promoting, and terminating
employees will be significantly more formalized than private enterprise and nonprofit
organization personnel procedures.

The formalization of personnel procedures refers to the complexity of personnel
procedures as well as to the constraints generated by external sources. This hypothesis
indicates that the personnel procedures regarding hiring, promotion, and termination
processes will be more complex and highly structured in public agencies than within
private enterprises and nonprofit organizations. Moreover, although not specifically
indicated by the hypothesis, it is suspected that the practice of terminating an employee
will be less common in the public sector than within private enterprises and nonprofit
organizations. Asking the professional managers about their relative organization's
personnel procedures as well as noting their attitude toward the termination of employees
in their organizations will measure this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4
Public agency managers will be significantly less likely to engage in managerial risk
taking than private enterprise managers and marginally less likely than nonprofit
organization managers.

For the purpose of this thesis, the term managerial risk-taking refers to the
likelihood a manager will employ innovative decision-making or create organizational
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changes (Moon 1999) that may cost the organization more than it gains, but have the
potential to benefit the organizational more than it costs. This hypothesis will be
measured by asking organizational managers about the attitude of their organization
toward taking managerial risks. The attitude expressed by the organizational manager
will be according to the perception of the manager supported by specific examples from
within the organization.

Hypothesis 5
Public agencies will be more likely than private enterprises and nonprofit organizations
to have formalized rules that govern task procedures and organizational activities.
This hypothesis focuses on the amount of red tape in the organizational sectors.
The literature indicates that a difference exists between the amount of formalization in
the public and private sectors. The term formalization refers to the amount of codified
rules and procedures that guide organizational employees, outside of personnel
procedures, as they perform their daily duties and the activities of the organization. This
thesis will not consider job descriptions as a guide to day-to-day operations, as the job
description only provides a general guideline for the position, not precise rules and
procedures. This thesis argues the public sector is more formalized than private
enterprises (Bozeman and Kingsley 1998; Moon 1999; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine
1976; Wilson 1989). This thesis also submits that public organizations will be more
formalized than nonprofit organizations. This hypothesis will be measured by
determining the extent an organization is guided by rules and procedures, as they carry
out their daily duties, according to the perceptions of the respective organization
managers.
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Hypothesis 6(a)
Public agency managers will be more constrained than private enterprise and nonprofit
organization managers by rules that require external approval to initiate new
organizational programs and to make procurement decisions involving a large monetary
cost.

This hypothesis focuses on the environmental constraints that hamper the public
manager's decision-making ability in two instrumental organizational functions. These
two functions are included in the same hypothesis due to their related importance in
organizational management. This thesis posits that public managers will require more
support or approval from people or organizations external to their organization than
private or nonprofit managers, as they seek to make purchases of substantial costs or as
they seek to initiate organizational programs that may have a heavy impact on the
operations of the organization. This hypothesis will be measured by evaluating the
procedures organizational managers employ to accomplish these organizational
functions.

Hypothesis 6(b)
Public agencies will be significantly more likely than private enterprises or nonprofit
organizations to have people external to the organization attempt to influence the
decisions, policies, or procedures of the organization.

This hypothesis refers to a significantly different aspect of an organization's
environment, the concept of organizational openness. This hypothesis will be measured
by evaluating the manager's perception of external influence applied to his or her
organization, in the organization's attempt to formulate internal decisions, policies, and
procedures within its respective sector. This influence may present itself in the form of
public scrutiny or interference.

Apples, Oranges, and Grapefruit 28
Hypothesis 7
Public agencies will be significantly less likely to utilize monetary performance
incentives such as bonuses and merit-based pay raises than private enterprises and
marginally less likely to utilize these incentives than nonprofit organizations.

For this thesis, the performance incentives referred to are bonuses for exemplary
performance or pay raises related to employee merit. The public agency will be less
likely to utilize this form of extrinsic motivation in order to inspire its employees. This
hypothesis will be measured by asking each organizational manager if his or her
organization employs monetary performance incentives. If an organization uses
monetary performance, each organizational manager will be asked to briefly explain his
or her organization's performance incentive program.

Methodology

In order to test the validity of these hypotheses, this thesis examines the seven
previously discussed sectoral differences. For operational purposes, the term private will
refer to the sector composed of market driven organizations that are dependent upon the
market for sustenance (Fottler 1981). These organizations also exist according to their
own volition; they are independent of government control beyond typical businessgovernment regulation relationships. The term nonprofit will refer to organizations that
are dependant upon donations from the public as well as contributions from both the
private and public sector to exist (Clarke 2001; Fottler 1981). These organizations also
originate independent of governmental decree. The term public will represent agencies in
the government sector; these organizations are constituted by law and are authorized to
collect taxes in order to fund the provision of service (Fottler 1981 ).
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This comparative analysis will employ an intensive qualitative case study of
several local government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and private enterprises.
Bozeman (1987) referred to the case study method of studying organizational differences
as the common method and stated the studies that have discovered the fewest differences
have looked at the largest number of organizations. Bozeman called for more case
studies to shed light on this debate, "It is likely that a carefully matched set of case
studies could shed much light on the publicness puzzle, but it appears no one has
undertaken such a systematic comparison of cases" (Bozeman 1987, 41 ). It is the intent
of this thesis to respond to Bozeman's plea for further investigation; however, this thesis
will deviate from the publicness approach preferred by Bozeman.
This comparative case study will utilize the empirical investigation method of
semi-structured empirical interviews. Scholars have noted that the management of public
agencies is not only different from the management of private enterprises, but it is also
more difficult (Allison 1980). Likewise, practitioners have offered anecdotal evidence
that emphatically suggests that public agencies are different than private enterprises
(Blumenthal 1979). The observations of these managers illuminate the necessity to
systematically investigate the perceptions of organizational managers in order to ascertain
the depth of the differences between the organizational sectors.
The data for this thesis will be collected by interviewing the directors of public
agencies, private business managers, and nonprofit organization leaders within a county
jurisdiction in a midwestem state. The public agencies analyzed within this study will
represent virtually every local governmental organization in the selected county that meet
the ten-member requirement and agree to participate. The nonprofit organizations will be
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selected to ensure they represent the differing organizational categories located in the
county, such as social services, public safety, utilities, and local charitable chapters.
Likewise, the private enterprises analyzed will consist of organizations that represent the
numerous types of businesses located in the county such as industry, retail sales,
wholesale sales, administrative services, public safety, utilities, restaurants, and
hospitality.
It is important to note that this thesis will not only compare organizations with

similar functions (Fottler 1981 ). This thesis intends to explore the differences and
similarities between organizations in each sector regardless of their organizational
function. This method will allow organizations that may not have a suitable sector
counterpart to be compared. This method is not a new approach to comparative studies,
as Bozeman has utilized this approach in the past (Bozeman and Kingsley 1998).
Nevertheless, it may be argued this approach is not as empirical as an approach that
systematically analyzes organizations with similar functions since other factors beyond
sector alignment may be responsible for the discovered differences. This logic is
recognized and commended, but the motive to analyze differences between the three
sectors calls for a broad scope of comparison. Therefore, this thesis humbly intends to
conduct an in-depth investigation of all three organizational sectors.
This thesis will impose a ten-employee requirement for organizations in order to
solidify the legitimacy of organizational size in the study. This requirement was also
suggested by previous research (Bozeman and Kingsley 1998; Marsden, Cook, and
Kalleberg 1994). Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg identify a ten-employee requirement as
they affirm organizational formalization rises rapidly with organizational size at a

Apples, Oranges, and Grapefruit 31
decelerating rate. The authors affirm that organizations that have fewer than ten
employees have a lack of intensity in organizational administration. Moreover, this
observed lack of intensity deteriorates within organizations that have ten or more
employees. However, it is important to note, that this requirement may limit the amount
of eligible public and nonprofit organizations in the county of study due to the smaller
size of some of these organizations.
This design may generate some data generalizability concerns. While to
generalize from such a concentrated area of organizations does seem inadequate, the
strength of this study does attempt to diminish this concern. The area chosen for this
study, while one of practicality due to the empirical interview technique (Berry 2002)
does have some scholarly importance. First, this area does include major areas of
production in the form or service provision, agriculture, and industry. Hence the
challenges and opportunities the vast majority of Americans face in the nonprofit, private,
and public sector are similar to those within this county of study. Second, this county also
has the privilege of housing major methods of transportation, in the forms of railways,
bussing routes, an interstate highway, and a county airport. Thus, the county is not
isolated; rather it is well connected to numerous locations in the United States. Third, the
analyzed area also houses several social service organizations from all three
organizational sectors. Finally, this county also has the privilege of housing two
institutions of higher learning in the form of a state university and a state community
college. Hence, the area is populated with well-educated members of society and those
seeking an education.
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As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the method of this study does limit the
breadth of the analysis, but this method makes up for this shortcoming by its empirical
depth (Berry 2002). "Even when the goal is more broad generalization, this is actually an
area where small N elite interviewers have an advantage over researchers doing surveys
on the mass public" (Goldstein 2002, 4). The semi-structured interview has several
strengths, but it also has a few weaknesses. The semi-structured interview is very
extensive in nature; hence it is very resource intensive in terms of travel and time.
Nevertheless this method allows the researcher to achieve an empirical submersion into
the research material from first-hand experts within the realm of administration (Leech
2002). Semi-structured interviews consist of open-ended questions (Aberbach and
Rockman 2002), the use of prompts (Berry 2002; Leech 2002), and a relaxation of
question order (Berry 2002). All these attributes allow the researcher to reap data from
an expert within the field of their study.
The advantages of the semi-structured interview that this research design will
employ are significant. The semi-structured interview will employ mainly open-ended
questions to allow for the flexible response of the interviewee. This research study will
also utilize prompts or probing questions that will be established prior to conducting the
interviews, in case the respondent provides an answer that does not relate to the intent of
the interview question. This interview process will also utilize a relaxed approach to the
ordering of the questions, dependant upon the respondent's conversation, to a certain
acceptable extent; hence this interview process will ensure that every question is
addressed, despite the flow of the conversation.
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In addition to the noted advantages of the semi-structured empirical interview,
these interviews will be conducted under strict confidentiality, in order to protect the
respondent's identity as well as to procure valid responses (Johnson and Joslyn 1991,
194; Leech 2002). The respondents will be forewarned prior to the start of the interview
that their responses will be recorded and coded for the interview, but their jurisdiction,
respective organization, and names will be kept in anonymity. Thus, the data will only
refer to a general characteristic of the organization and a generic title for the respondent
as well as the sector they reside within. Hence, the ground rules will be established prior
to commencing the interview. "Outlining and understanding the ground rules is not only
crucial for getting the interview in the short run, but crucial for continuing our
discipline's ability to conduct such research in the future" (Goldstein 2002, 3).
This intensive case study based upon semi-structured elite interviews possesses a
fantastic strength in determining sector differences, as the elite interviews of
organizational directors and managers provide direct testimony of private, nonprofit, and
public organizational characteristics. This method of study takes a concentrated look at
private, nonprofit, and public organizations by asking each leader interviewed the same
ten pre-determined questions (including probing questions), in addition to demographic
information about their careers and organizations (Appendix 1). By analyzing their
different responses to these questions, the manager's perceptions will provide wealthy
insight toward the differences and similarities that exist between the public, nonprofit,
and private sector. This strength is based on the fact that the collected responses will be
the professional perceptions of leaders from all three organizational sectors. "Semi-
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structured interviews allow the respondents the chance to be the experts and to inform the
research" (Leech 2002, 5).
In addition to the ten-item questionnaire, this research design will also attempt to
make a conscious note of the interview environment (Woliver 2002), in an attempt to
acknowledge any sectoral anomalies or similarities that are exhibited by the milieu of the
interview itself. Hence, if the police chief is routinely interrupted by telephone calls from
citizens voicing their demands, those intrusions will be noted in comparison to a private
business manager who does not field any telephone calls directly from customers.
Moreover, this study will also attempt to conclude each interview by providing the
respondent an opportunity to contribute to the interview by adding anything they perceive
as important. This interview technique was emphasized by Woliver (2002).
"Interviewers cannot anticipate everything and you need to give the respondents openings
to tell you about an event, connection, or insight, that you didn't think to ask them about"
(Woliver 2002, 2). In addition, this interview will attempt to solicit a follow up
interview, if needed.
Despite the numerous strengths of this research design, some apparent
weaknesses also demand illumination. First, as a case study, the data can be criticized as
time and place bound. However, the elite interviews of numerous organizational
managers over an eleven-month period work to alleviate this weakness. Second, the
coding of the research data obtained by semi-structured interviews fails in comparison to
more systematic research designs that are more quantitative in nature. Aberbach and
Rockman addressed this weakness by stating ''the kinds of data we collected made it
more difficult to produce an analytically elegant end product, at least if one uses
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statistical elegance as the major criterion in evaluating analytical elegance" (Aberbach
and Rockman 2002, 2).
This analytical study does not rely on a statistical survey that efficiently scratches
the surface of the issues at hand; rather the investigation must go deeper, and the method
of a semi-structured interview was selected to accomplish that very task. Thus, it would
be difficult to truly examine the integral nature of an apple, orange, or grapefruit by
scratching the surface of each fruit at randomly selected points. Such an investigation
would produce data that indicate similarities and differences, but not as effectively as a
study that submerges into the meat and core of each fruit. This thesis intends to dive into
the core of organizations from all three sectors within the selected county in order to
produce systematic empirical data regarding sector similarities and differences.
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Chapter 2
Efficiency, Efficiency Where Art Thou Efficiency?
Findings
A total of 50 elite interviews were completed during the months of August and
September of 2003. These interviews were combined with 10 previous elite inquiries that
were conducted during October of 2002. ii Hence, this study is comprised of 60
interviews that were conducted over a three-month period. The length of these semistructured interviews ranged from 20 minutes to one hour and five minutes. The average
duration was 34 minutes per interview. All but two of these interviews were conducted
face to face at the place of the respondent's choosing. One interview was conducted over
the telephone, and one questionnaire was completed through e-mail correspondence.
The 60 organizations involved in this study were all from the targeted midwestern county and 59 of the organizations had ten employees or more according to the
research design. At the time of this study, one private enterprise only had nine
employees, but normally employed over ten. The manager stated his organization was
currently involved in the hiring process (Enterprise 20 2003). A total of 20 organizations
from the public, private for-profit, and private non-for-profit sectors were analyzed.
The public sector organizations utilized in this study were comprised of
organizations that averaged 101 employees. The statistical median of 45 for the number
of employees within the public sector was a better representation of the agency size. The
public agency director averaged nine years in the position and was typically male in
gender, as males represented 80 percent of the respondents. The private sector
enterprises utilized in this study consisted of organizations that averaged 83 employees
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with a statistical median of 40 employees. The average length in office for the private
sector managers was eight years. The private sector managers were also predominantly
male at the rate of 80 percent. The nonprofit organizations utilized in this study had an
average of 66 employees or volunteers, with a statistical median of 39 employees. The
average length in office for the nonprofit organization's executive director or manager
was ten years. Unlike the public and private for-profit organizations, the gender of the
nonprofit organization executive director was predominantly female at the rate of 55
percent (Clarke, 2001).
Prior to conducting, these interviews, the organizational respondents were advised
that the purpose of this study was to compare how public agencies, private businesses,
and nonprofit organizations were similar and different in the local community. Only a
small amount of public agencies and private businesses solicited for analysis turned down
the opportunity to be involved within this studyiii. Strikingly, the most difficult
organizations to analyze were the local public organizations, but through persistence most
agreed to be interviewed. In contrast, the nonprofit organizations were the most
cooperative.

Hypothesis I
The primary organizational goal ofpublic agencies will be distinctively different from the
goal ofprivate enterprises, but only marginally different from the primary goal of
nonprofit organizations.

This hypothesis was analyzed by asking the respondent to identify what they
perceived to be the most primary or important goal for their organization, with the
explicit understanding that most agencies have more than one important goal. The
managerial responses were coded into the following seven separate categories: (1) to
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serve the public, (2) to serve select members of the community, (3) to make a profit, (4)
to provide quality customer service, ( 5) organizational tasks, (6) administration, and (7)
fundraising. The primary goal to serve the public refers the priority to serve everyone
within an organization's geographic location. The goal to serve select members of the
community refers to serving only a distinct group of people from the community. The
goal of profit refers to existing in order to make money. Focusing on customer service
indicates that the organization is primarily concerned with satisfying its customers. The
primary goal of organizational tasks refers to the priority to perform an organizational
duty such as ensuring traffic safety by the issuance of traffic citations. The goal of
administration refers to an organization's primary concentration on administrative
functions such as long-range planning. The goal of fundraising indicates the organization
is primarily concerned with increasing the financial capital in its organization. These
seven categories were constructed according to the responses of the organizational
managers from each sector.
It is important to note that all seven categories of the primary goal were not

mentioned within each sector. The public sector concentrated on only three of the
primary goals identified by the organizational managers. They focused on serving the
public, organizational tasks, and administration (Figure 1). The private enterprises
focused only on making a profit and customer service (Figure 1). The nonprofit sector
organizations had the most diverse amount of organizational goals as the managers
claimed the importance of five primary goals. These managers stressed serving the
public, organizational tasks, serving select members of the community, profit, and
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fundraising (Figure 1). Hence, the type of goals and the percentage of the organizations
that profess these goals emphatically illuminate distinct sectoral differences.
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Figure 1: The Comparison of the Primary Organizational Goal
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The relationship defined in Hypothesis One was vigorously supported by the
responses of each organizational sector. Seventy-five percent of the public agencies
stated their primary goal was to provide service to the public (Figure 1). Eighty percent of
the private organizations declared their most important goal were to make a profit (Figure
1). The primary goal of the third sector also supports the hypothesized relationship as
only 40 percent of these organizations have a primary goal to serve the general public
(Figure 1). Hence, the primary goal of public agencies is significantly different from the
primary goal of a private business and more than marginally different than nonprofit
organizations.
The public sector organizations analyzed in this study strongly indicated that they
exist primarily to serve every person within their geographically determined jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, 15 percent of the public agency respondents focused on organizational
tasks and ten percent of the respondents focused upon administrative functions (Figure
1). One of the public sector directors interviewed affirmed that the primary goal for his
organization was staff coordination, long-range planning, and infrastructure (Agency 2
2002). Another public agency director asserted the main goal for her organization was to
ensure police officer safety (Agency 3 2003). This goal has been categorized as an
organizational task, as the goal only indicates an internal operational focus.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of public agency respondents indicated the
primary goal for their organizations was to provide service to the citizens within their
respective communities. One of the municipal directors said they exist to provide
services. "To provide the best services we can with the available funds. We exist to
serve. Sometimes we lose sight of that" (Agency 7 2003). Another public agency
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director from a public school system asserted they existed to provide a quality education
at an affordable cost to the taxpayers (Agency 18 2003). Moreover, another public
agency director from a municipal public safety department stated it was the goal of his
agency "To provide a public service that is responsive to the citizen's needs within the
community" (Agency 5 2002). Hence, the prominent goal of public agencies is to serve
the public.
In contrast to the goal of public service, the predominant goal of private
enterprises is to make a profit. In addition to the above-mentioned 80 percent, 20 percent
of the private for-profit organizations indicated they were concerned with customer
service (Figure 1). Nevertheless, the goal of customer service could be considered a tool
to produce a profit. A private enterprise manager affirmed the goal of his organization is
"To provide good service and good food. Service is the number one word. The profit
motive is present. If business is slow, you will need to cutback on manpower to ensure
the bottom line, money" (Enterprise 7 2003). Another private enterprise manager from
the entertainment business stated that the goal of her organization is to provide the best
service possible for their customers. She also affirmed, "Profit is what drives everything,
that is the big difference" (Enterprise 12 2003). Another enterprise manager declared, by
treating your customers well, the business could make more money and increase their
employees' wages (Enterprise 14 2003).
The primary goal of the third sector also supports the hypothesized relationship
as 40 percent of these organizations have a primary goal to serve the general public, but
45 percent of the nonprofit organizations strive to serve only a select population of the
county. The remaining 15 percent are concerned with either fundraising, internal tasks,
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or making a profit. Hence, the goals of the private nonprofit organizations are more
similar to the public agencies, as several nonprofit organizations also strive to serve the
general public. One nonprofit social service organization director said it is their number
one goal to provide a helping hand to those in need (Organization 17 2003). Yet, another
nonprofit public safety organization affirmed they exist to provide public safety
(Organization 4 2003).
However, 45 percent of the nonprofit organizations indicated that the primary
goal of their organizations was to serve a select population of the community based upon
the community member's select needs. Hence, they serve the people in the community,
but they provide a narrow scope of service. One of the nonprofit social service directors
described the goal of her organization as "To provide support for the victims of sexual
violence through counseling or advocacy" (Organization 9 2003). Another executive
director said their agency goal was to "Provide quality recreational opportunities and
support for people with developmental disabilities and their families" (Organization 14
2003). To illustrate the larger scope that affects public agencies, one public school
superintendent said,
10 years ago a Ben and Jerry's CEO thought he was a fantastic businessman
and he spoke to teachers. He thought he could get them to change the world.
One old teacher asked if he used real good milk and the best fruit in his ice cream.
The businessman replied only the best. The teacher said one big difference
between you and us is that we cannot choose only the best. We have to get what
we get (Agency 20 2003).
There were a small number of nonprofit organizations that proclaimed
organizational goals that were drastically different from the goals of public agencies.
One of these organizations stated that nonprofit organizations also strive to make a profit.
The assistant executive director qualified his statement by declaring the primary
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difference between nonprofit organizations and a private enterprise is that nonprofit
organizations are governed by how they can spend the profits they earn (Organization 8
2003). Yet, another organization manager emphasized the importance offundraising
within her organization. She stated the primary goal of her agency is to "Raise money to
make an impact within the community. To fund local agencies"(Organization 10 2003).

Hypothesis 2
Public agencies are more likely than private enterprises or nonprofit organizations
to emphasize the values ofaccountability and responsiveness.
The data collected for this hypothesis were generated by asking organizational
directors and managers to rank four organizational values in order of importance on a
scale of one to four, with one representing the most important, according to the
perception of the organizational manager. The collected data emphatically indicate the
hypothesized relationship was not supported. In fact, after comparing the statistical
mean, the organizational values appear to be remarkably similar between all three
organizational sectors (Figure 2). Hence, the collected data do not indicate that public
agencies differ from private and nonprofit organizations in the preference of
accountability and responsiveness as predicted.
In contrast, it appears the value of responsiveness is marginally more important to
both the nonprofit organizations and private enterprises than the public agencies.
Moreover, the value of accountability also appears to be marginally more important to the
private enterprises and non-profit organizations within the study than the public agencies
in the study. According to the tabulated data the most important value for the public
agency is effectiveness. Another interesting finding produced by the comparison of
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statistical mean is that the public and nonprofit sectors placed the importance of values in
the same order with effectiveness first, responsiveness second, accountability third, and
efficiency last. On the other hand, the private sector rated the value of responsiveness
first followed closely by effectiveness, accountability, and efficiency.
The Ranking of Organizational Values According to Importance
With the Value of Four Representing the Most Important and the
Value of One Representing the Least Important
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*n = 15 for the value of

accountability.

At this time, it is imperative to note that the value of accountability was only used
in 50 of the 60 interviews. The organizational value of fairness was previously used
within the initial ten interviews in place of the value of accountability. Hence the
statistical mean of the value of accountability was based upon 50 organizations. The
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statistical mean for the three remaining values was calculated according to the responses
of all sixty organizations.
It was very interesting to note that the value of efficiency was seen as the least

important amongst the three organizational sectors (Figure 2), but it was a value that was
popularly referred to as a distinct difference between the three organizational sectors
according to the organizational managers. Several of the participating managers noted
the organizational value of efficiency as a key difference between the local level
organizational sectors (Enterprise 13 2003; Enterprise 12 2003; Organization 8 2003;
Organization 11 2003) Hence, the value of efficiency may have been ranked as the least
important on a scale of one to four, but for some private businesses and nonprofit
organizations efficiency was prized as a crucial organizational value despite the assigned
ranking.

Hypothesis 3
Public agency personnel procedures related to hiring, promoting, and terminating
employees will be significantly more formalized than private enterprise and nonprofit
organization personnel procedures.

The semi-structured interviews produced data that significantly support the
predicted relationship. The data were collected by analyzing the hiring, promotion, and
termination processes and procedures of the sixty organizations according to the
description provided by the respondents. The data clearly indicate that public
organizations employ a more formalized hiring process, promotion process, and
termination process than both private enterprises and nonprofit organizations (Figure 3).
In addition, the data also indicate that more public agencies are required to obtain
approval from personnel outside of their respective agencies to make decisions in the
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hiring process (Figure 5). Moreover, the data collected from these interviews also
strongly indicate that public organizations are less likely to terminate an employee than
either a private business or nonprofit organization (Figure 4).
Percentage of Organizations Employing Formalized Personnel
Procedures
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The formalization of the hiring process illuminates a significant difference
between the three sectors. This formalization was defined by having a hiring process that
goes beyond the review of applications and one employment interview. According to the
data, 90 percent of the public agencies have a formalized hiring process as compared to
55 percent of the nonprofit organizations and private enterprises (Figure 3). Moreover,
80 percent of the public agencies have to seek approval from an entity external to their
own organization to hire someone compared to 30 percent of the nonprofit organizations
and 20 percent of the private businesses (Figure 5).

The Percentage of Organizations That Require
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A director of a municipal public safety agency described his organization's hiring
procedures as dictated by government regulations. He stated the process is very formal
and it requires the hiring decisions to go through a municipal police and fire board for
testing and evaluation (Agency 5 2002). Another public agency stated that the hiring
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process consists of"An orientation as to what they do, three different formal tests, an
interview with the assistant director, and then a meeting with the director" (Agency 6
2003). However, there were two exceptions in formality that existed in the public sector.
One director of parks asserted they "Hire anyone who is certified and applies. They
[applicants] usually know someone on the park board" (Agency 9 2003).
The formality of hiring procedures within nonprofit organizations and private
enterprises was relatively the same (Figure 3). Both sectors did contain organizations that
utilize formal hiring processes. One private enterprise manager described his
organization's hiring process as a three-step interview process (Enterprise 17 3003).
Another private business manager stated, "We look for qualifications through testing.
The test is pass/fail. We then do background checks of the qualified and eliminate some
due to certain crimes the applicant may have committed. We then conduct an interview"
(Enterprise 16 2003). One of the nonprofit volunteer organizations utilized a formal
hiring process. The director stated they conduct a thorough background check on an
applicant and then the candidate is reviewed by a committee of organizational members
for approval. The applicant then has to be approved by personnel outside of their own
organization before the subject can be hired into the organization (Organization 1 2003).
Nevertheless, several of the organizations from each sector also utilize informal
methods to hire their employees. One nonprofit organization director stated they do not
have to hire anyone. He added people just come to them and ask to join their allvolunteer organization (Organization 6 2003). On one occasion, when this author arrived
at a private business, the manager introduced himself and then said he had to speak with
an attractive young lady that was standing near this author first, "for obvious reasons"
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(Enterprise 10 2003). This author then witnessed the manager interview the young lady
for employment at the local restaurant. During this interview, the manager made no
pretense to ensure the applicant was qualified, but measured whether or not the subject
truly wanted to work. At the close of the interview, the subject was hired and scheduled
to work the next morning. During the research interview, the manager affirmed he makes
the hiring decisions and he formulates his decision based on personality (Enterprise 10
2003).
In addition, the promotion processes are also more formalized in the public sector
than those within the nonprofit and private sectors (Figure 3). Eighty-three percent of the
public agencies that have promotions have formalized procedures compared to 17 percent
who have informal promotion procedures. In contrast only 37 percent of the private
enterprises that have promotions have formalized procedures compared to 63 percent that
have informal procedures. Only 33 percent of the nonprofit organizations that have
promotions employ formal procedures, and 67 percent utilize informal promotion
procedures.
Most of the public agencies described their promotion processes as complex.
However, three public agencies stated that promotions are limited within their
organization. One of the agencies in the public sector that did not practice a formal
promotion process was a municipal street department that promotes its employees
according to experience and seniority (Agency 1 2002). In contrast, several agencies
described a very formal promotion process. "Promotions are based upon criteria
established by the board. Points are based upon personnel evaluations, merit, and
education as well as a promotional exam and an oral interview" (Agency 12 2003). A
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county law enforcement organization director stated their promotions were based on an
"oral exam with the Merit Commission. Applicants have to write a 300 words or less
thesis stating why they should be promoted, which is graded by the merit commission.
Applicants need a 70 percent to pass the grade" (Agency 14 2003).
Most of the promotion processes in the private and nonprofit organizations are
informal (Figure 3). In addition, one of the private organizations does not have
promotion opportunities for their employees, and two of the nonprofit organizations do
not offer promotion opportunities. The majority of the formalized promotion processes
in each of these sectors mimics the established hiring process for the respective
organizations. For example, a director of a wholesale supplier stated that their
promotions are based on merit, but the applicant would have to apply for the new position
like a new hire and the candidate would have to take a management test (Enterprise 9
2003). Nevertheless, the predominant promotional processes within the private and
nonprofit sectors are informal. A retail automobile sales manager stated they have "no set
process for promotion-based upon performance and feeling"(Enterprise 1 2002). A
cleaning service manager stated their promotion procedures are "due to evaluation-their
P.R. ability to relate to co-workers" (Enterprise 6 2003).
Terminations in the public sector, although more rare, are also governed by a
more formalized process than the termination processes within the private sector and the
nonprofit sector (Figure 3). Only one of the 20 public organizations did not have a
formal termination process. A park superintendent stated that he just terminates
employees since his organization only offers seasonal employment (Agency 9 2003).
However, the other 19 organizations all possessed formalized termination processes, if
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needed. A municipal director stated they have a progressive disciplinary policy that
includes an oral warning, written warning, suspension, and then termination (Agency 7
2003). One municipal public director lamented the complexity and difficulty in
terminating a public employee as one of the major differences between public agencies
and private enterprises. The director perceived less control over his employees due to the
infeasibility of terminating them (Agency 5 2002).
The majority of private and nonprofit organizations also have formalized
termination procedures their organizations are required to follow (Figure 3). 85 percent
of the nonprofit organizations that have terminations employ formal procedures, and 80
percent of the private enterprises that terminate employees employ formal procedures.
Nevertheless, some informal termination processes still exist. One of the private sector
restaurant managers stated that they evaluate their employees and discuss any problems
during Sunday evening meetings and the employee usually knows the termination is
coming (Enterprise 10 2003 ). A private manager in charge of a utility stated that
terminations do happen. When they occur he holds a voluntary termination meeting that
the employee is not required to attend (Enterprise 13 2003). A director of a nonprofit
social service stated that she rarely has to fire anyone. If she needs to terminate an
employee, she said she just does not call the employee back. "Usually they figure it out"
(Organization 16, 2003).

Hypothesis 4
Public agency managers will be significantly less likely to engage in managerial risk
taking than private enterprise managers and marginally less likely than nonprofit
organization managers.
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The semi-structured interviews produced data that did not support this
hypothesized relationship. Contrary to the hypothesized relationship, public agency
managers were only marginally less likely to partake in managerial risk taking than
private business managers, and they were just as likely to practice innovation as nonprofit
executive directors (Figure 6). Seventy percent of the public agency and nonprofit
managers affirmed they perceived their organizations as being in favor of managerial risk
taking and innovation. Eighty-five percent of the private business managers perceived
that their organizations were in favor of this management principle.
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The majority of each organizational sector indicated that they perceived their
organizations were in favor of innovation (Figure 6). As noted, a large percentage of
public agencies were in favor of managerial risk taking or trying new things. One public
works director stated, "I despise the term, we've always done it that way" (Agency 2
2002). He went on to add his agency is in favor of innovation. Another public director
of a municipal library stated they are "Very open to try new things. [We] try to stay ahead
of the public" (Agency 8 2003). Yet some public agencies approach managerial risk
taking more cautiously. "Traditionally fire service does not openly embrace change
without thorough research. 200 years of tradition not impeded by progress. We are
doing new things, but [they] are not embraced quickly. Changes [are] implemented
relatively slow" (Agency 3 2002).
Private businesses have a higher tendency to embrace managerial risk taking than
both the public and nonprofit sectors (Figure 6). A manager for a private utility described
his organization's managerial risk taking attitude as "Pretty open to it and encourage it.
Try to come up with new ideas-to think outside the box. Try to develop new ways to
handle situations" (Enterprise 13 2003). Another private business manager related
managerial risk taking to the growth of his company. "[We] want to grow as quick as
possible. Employee suggestions have built us. Employee ideas help the company to
grow" (Enterprise 14 2003). A private automobile retail sales manager summed up his
organization's attitude toward managerial risk taking by stating they "Like risk taking.
To succeed you have to take risks. We encourage it, but monitor it" (Enterprise 1 2002).
Yet some of the private businesses in the study approached managerial risk taking very
cautiously. "Not too much risk taking. All pretty much placid with established accounts"
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(Enterprise 6 2003). One organizational manager stated her organization is "Careful
about doing new things. We think things out first" (Enterprise 12 2003).
The nonprofit organizations in the study also indicated a propensity to take
managerial risks (Figure 6). One organization executive director in the field of public
safety summed up the attitude of his organization by stating they have an "Open mind in
the department. If a new tool or technique is available, we suggest the members try it.
We are eager to try new techniques or tools" (Organization 4 2003). Another
organizational manager stated her organization was also open to managerial risk taking
and innovation. She stated that her organization was one of the first in the state to soften
water with lime instead of salt (Organization 18, 2003). One of the nonprofit
organizations that cautiously approached managerial risk taking described her
organization as "cautious visionaries" (Organization 19 2003). The executive director
added that they do not take risks with money and will not do things at the expense of
existing programs, but if there is a need they will try to get it done.

Hypothesis 5
Public agencies will be more likely than private enterprises and nonprofit organizations
to have formalized rules that govern task procedures and organizational activities.

The semi-structured interviews attempted to identify the presence of formalization
in the organizations, by inquiring about the presence of employee guidelines or
procedures that exist within each organization. The data indicate that public agencies are
more formalized in the procedures and policies that guide the day-to-day operations of
the organization than both the nonprofit and private sector (Figure 7). Hence, the
predicted relationship in hypothesis five is supported. Additionally, it is significant to
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note that only three of the public agencies out of 20 did not have formalized procedures
to guide their organizational members.

The Percentage of Organizations That Employ
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As the tabulated data indicate, 85 percent of the public agencies possessed
organizational procedures that govern their employees compared to 65 percent of the
.
nonprofit organizations and private enterprises (Figure 7). A director for a county public
safety department described the formalization in his organization by stating, "We operate
according to a policies and procedures handbook. It governs about everything we do,
when we do it, and how we do it" (Agency 11 2003). A municipal public safety
organization director asserted they have rules and regulations as well as general orders
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that their employees need to follow. These procedures guide their conduct and behavior
as well as police pursuits and the use of force to affect an arrest (Agency 15 2003). One
of the public agency directors that did not have established procedures stated, "We do not
have SOP's. No standard way of doing things, but we do want one" (Agency 2 2003).
The majority of private enterprises also possessed formalized procedures for their
personnel to follow on a day-to-day basis within their organizations (Figure 7). A private
business manager involved in a financial institution stressed that her organization has
extensive regulations and procedures to follow. She explained that there are ten thick
binders that govern the technological side of the business alone (Enterprise 8 2003). A
manager from a wholesale sales chain indicated that they refer to the policies that govern
their business as SOi's or standard operating instructions. He stated these SOi's come in
a four inch thick binder as well as on the computer and these instructions describe a stepby-step process of what the employee is required to do. The branch manager added that
every year the business conducts an audit of each branch to evaluate up to six standard
operating instructions, in order to ensure everyone in the organization is still following
procedures. "The idea is to be standardized across the company so employees could
move from store to store" (Enterprise 9 2003). One private business manager said his
organization has procedures that even dictate when items should be cleaned within the
store as well as how to properly clean those items. He said, "We get procedures for
everything" (Agency 20 2003). Despite this amount of formalization other private
enterprises do not operate under this amount of formality. A manager of an
entertainment facility stated that they do not have written procedures that govern
employee tasks, except requiring everyone to have a ticket prior to viewing a movie
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(Enterprise 12 2003). Another private manager in the employment staffing industry
affirmed that they did not have any form of operations manual at this time (Enterprise 15
2003).
The nonprofit organizations in the county also appeared to be rather formalized in
the day-to-day operations of their respective organizations (Figure 7). A nonprofit social
service director stated, "We have very specific procedures that direct the staff. Very few
responsibilities are not guided by written regulation" (Organization 3 2003).
Another nonprofit social service agency said procedures "guide what they do throughout
the day and what they need to do every hour" (Organization 5 2003). Another nonprofit
social service agency director stated that his organization is highly regulated and
lamented the formality in his organization. "I think that people misconceive that the
extensive rules and regulations are just made up to make the employee's life more
difficult. It [the organization] is regulated by other agencies" (Organization 8, 2003).
Nevertheless, some nonprofit organizations were not formalized beyond a personnel code
or job description. A President for a local nonprofit chapter simply said they did not have
any formalized procedures (Organization 2 2003).

Hypothesis 6(a)
Public agency managers will be more constrained than private enterprise and nonprofit
organization managers by rules that require external approval to initiate new
organizational programs and to make procurement decisions involving a large monetary
cost.

Two items in the interview questionnaire were devoted to these two prominent
aspects of organizational management. The relationship predicated by hypothesis 6(a)
was partially supported by the findings of the semi-structured interviews. Public
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agencies were substantially more likely to require approval from an entity external to
their respective agency in order to make substantial purchases for their organization than
private businesses and marginally more likely than nonprofit organizations (Figure 8).
However, the semi-structured interviews revealed that nonprofit organizations were more
likely to require external approval to establish new programs in their organization than
both public agencies and private enterprises. Nevertheless, public agencies were still
substantially more likely to require approval to implement a new program in their
organization than private enterprises (Figure 9).
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The rules that govern the procurement procedures in each of these organizational
sectors appears to be the most constraining within the public sector as 90 percent of the
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public agencies have to seek external approval in order to make a substantial purchase
compared to 60 percent of the private businesses and 80 percent of the nonprofit
organizations (Figure 8). For the purposes of this study, the requirement to get a budget
approved by any external entity fulfils the requirement of this hypothesis.
Concerning the public agencies, only two of the 20 public organizations did not
have to require approval to make substantial purchases within their organizations. It was
interesting to note that these two organizations were both local public school districts.
One of these organizations had very extensive purchase procedures. The system was
primarily established to prevent embezzlement of government funds, but there was no
requirement to seek approval from an external authority (Agency 17 2003). One of the
school directors described his organization's purchasing procedures by stating, "Over
$10,000 we would have to seek a public bid on the item, but under $10,000 we use our
best judgment and fill out a purchase order" (Agency 18 2003).
For the remaining 18 organizations it was a necessity to seek approval to make
substantial purchases within their respective agencies, but the value at which they had to
gain the approval of an external governing board, council, administrator, or another
agency director varied between agencies (Figure 8). A municipal park administrator
affirmed that he had a lot of leeway in the organization and did not need to get the park
board's approval to make purchases, but then he stated that his budget has to be approved
by the board and the board writes and signs all of the organization's checks. He went on
to lament the role the park board plays in the purchasing of equipment, adding it took six
years to purchase a fountain for the park and one year to purchase a piece of playground
equipment (Agency 9 2003). A public social service agency asserted they are required to
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get every purchase approved. The agency administrator continued to explain the process
by stating they would have to contact at least three separate agencies and the extreme
procedures that guide her agency would cause a person outside of her organization to pull
their hair out (Agency 19 2003).
On the other hand, the requirement for private businesses to seek approval from
entities external to their local organization was not as prevalent (figure 8). One business
summed up the purchasing process by stating the office manager handles all of the
purchases and he just tries to find the best value (Enterprise 1 2002). A private enterprise
public safety organization manager stated that they make the purchasing decisions at the
upper levels of his organization and that no one external to the enterprise would be
consulted for approval (Enterprise 11 2003). Nevertheless, 60 percent of the private
businesses had to seek approval from personnel external to their organizations. A branch
manager from a wholesale supply store indicated that he is required to submit a budget
for approval to the chief financial officer located in a separate city. He added that the
chief financial officer makes the decision dependent upon available funds (Enterprise 9
2003). Another private business manager for a retail store said that he can make
purchases up to $100.00, but anything above the $100.00 has to be approved by the
corporate office (Enterprise 14 2003).
Nonprofit organizations also have strict rules governing the need for external
approval to make a purchase, but they are not as stringent as public sector organizations
(Figure 8). One nonprofit public safety director asserted that he would have to get the
approval of the municipal liaison officer prior to making a substantial purchase
(Organization 1 2003). A director in a nonprofit social service organization said that all
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substantial purchases must be within the budget and the board of directors must approve
the budget (Organization 3 2003). Another social service nonprofit organization director
asserted he is required to bring the recommendation to the board of directors and then the
board has a designated person in charge of making all the necessary purchases
(Organization 7 2003). On the other hand, this sector also contained a few agencies that
possessed freedom within their purse strings. One social service organization director
stated she mainly seeks donations for new equipment. She stated that she has never
purchased anything so expensive that would require her to go through the formalized
bidding process (Organization 11 2003). Another social service organization director
asserted the agency seeks donations first, but does not have to seek external approval for
the purchases they do make (Organization 12 2003).
The second critical managerial task related to hypothesis 6(a) is the necessity to
obtain the approval of an entity external to the organization in order to implement a new
program in the organization. For the purposes of this study, organizations that only had
to seek authorization for programs due to a related large monetary cost were not
considered to require external approval for programming decisions. Thus, if a public
agency only had to seek external approval to create a program that would cost the
organization a substantial amount of money that organization would be considered a yes
in the purchasing facet of this hypothesis, but not in the programming portion of this
hypothesis.
The nonprofit organizations were marginally more constrained by the need to
seek external approval to create and implement a new organizational program than public
agencies, but they were substantially more constrained by the requirement to seek
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external approval to implement new programs than private businesses. Seventy percent
of the nonprofit organizations, as well as 55 percent of the public sector agencies, were
required to seek external approval, compared to only 30 percent of the private sector
enterprises (Figure 9).

The Percentage of Organizations That Require External Approval
for Programming Decisions
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Figure 9: Program Approval - From an External Source

A nonprofit public safety director described the process his organization would go
through to start a new program by stating a committee made up of three organizational
directors would look into the proposal and a report would be prepared and then turned
into the board of trustees for their approval prior to implementing the program
(Organization 4 2003). A manager for a nonprofit utility said that the new program
would have to receive board authorization. She stated that they just procured a new

Apples, Oranges, and Grapefruit 63
mapping system at no monetary cost to them, but they had to go to the board in order to
obtain their approval (Organization 18 2003). Yet, some of the nonprofit organizations
affirmed that they did not have to garner external approval. One nonprofit social service
director simply said she did not need any external approval to implement new programs
in her organization (Organization 5 2003). Another nonprofit social service director said
they "Just do it" (Organization 9 2003) adding that they do not need permission but the
state chapter does oversee their operations.
Fifty-five percent of public agencies also have to seek approval from at least one
external entity prior to implementing a new program within their respective organizations
(Figure 9). A municipal public works director stated that a recommendation would first
go through an advisory committee, which is comprised of people from the community,
and then that committee would make a proposal to the city council for approval (Agency
2 2002). A municipal park director stated that he would have to bring the program
proposal in front of the park board and convince them to approve the program (Agency 9
2003). A director in a school system stated they would
Do a feasibility study to compare the costs and benefits to the district. Analyze the
data from the study. Draw conclusions on whether or not to implement it. Make a
recommendation to the board of education; maybe even a lawyer to ensure
everything is legal, and maybe the regional superintendent (Agency 20 2003).
Yet, 45 percent of the public agencies did not have to seek external approval to
implement new programs. One of the municipal public safety directors indicated that the
director makes the final decision within the organization and he controls the operations of
the organization (Agency 5 2002). A public health director stated that he is authorized to
create programs in the organization, ifthe funding is there (Agency 13 2003).
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The most flexible organizational sector at creating new programs without seeking
external approval is the private sector (Figure 9). 70 percent of the private enterprises did
not have to solicit approval from anyone external to their organization. A private
business manager involved in providing a service stated he would simply evaluate the
cost-saving effectiveness of the program as well as the impact the program would upon
employee retention. He did not have to seek external approval (Enterprise 6 2003).
Another private business said he would contact the business owner, but the owner would
probably be the one that thought of the new program in the first place (Enterprise 7
2003). Nevertheless, 30 percent of the private businesses were required to contact
entities external to their organization such as a retail administration office that was
required to contact the district vice president in order to get her approval prior to
implementing a new program (Enterprise 5 2002).

Hypothesis 6(b)
Public agencies will be significantly more likely than private enterprises or nonprofit
organizations to have people external to the organization attempt to influence the
decisions, policies, or procedures of the organization.
This predicted relationship was measured by analyzing the extent the organization
was open to influence from the general public, the media, and other organizations
according to the perception of the organizational manager. This perception of outside
influence was based on the ability of an external entity to manipulate the decisions or
policies that are made in an organization. The data collected through the semi-structured
interviews emphatically support hypothesis 6(b) as public agencies are significantly more
open to external influence than private businesses, and nonprofit organizations (Figure
10). Ninety-five percent of the public agencies indicated that people outside of their
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organization could influence the decisions or policies they make within their
organization, compared to 70 percent of the nonprofit organizations and 50 percent of the
private enterprises.

The Percentage of Organizations Open to External
Influence
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Figure 10: Propensities for External Influence (Fish Bowl Effect)

Every public agency but one acknowledged that their public organization was
open to influence from the general public, the media, or another government entity such
as the state legislature (Figure 10). The lone public director that did not perceive the
ability of any outside entity to influence his agency simply answered no and did not
elaborate. Nevertheless, 19 other public agencies testified that they are open to external
influence to one degree or another. "Every organization is influenced by the people it
works with. The community has a lot to say and they can go through the elected board.
We are also regulated by the federal government, legislature, and state school board"
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(Agency 20 2003). One municipal manager stated, "Yes, everything we do is in a
fishbowl" (Agency 7 2003). The manager added the media could be a powerful influence
on his organization by their critique and their ability to mobilize the public. In addition,
he stated labor unions and businesses also have an impact on the decisions they make. A
municipal library director indicated that her organization is very open to the members of
the community. "People come in to talk with us and we either change policies within the
organization or we explain why the policy has to stand. We listen to what the public has
to say, even to the children. Anybody or any person that has a need may walk in and we
should be open to them" (Agency 8 2003).
Nonprofit organizations are more likely to be open to external influence than
private enterprises (Figure 10). One nonprofit public safety director indicated that his
organization is not open to influence by the public or the media, but a local municipal
organization has a great deal of influence in the day-to-day procedures of his
organization. The nonprofit director provided an example of this influence by stating the
public agency director influenced the posting of his personnel at the latest community
function that required security (Organization 1 2003). A nonprofit social service director
stated that the media, the general public, and other competing social service agencies
influence the decisions they make in their organization. She added the people within the
community generally have a negative attitude toward the establishment of a group home
in the community and her organization attempts to combat this resistance through the
local media (Organization 12 2003). Another social service director indicated that the
media, the public, and other organizations influence his organization. "The national news
stated that most promiscuity occurs in between the hours of 4 and 7 p.m. so we started an
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after school program" (Organization 20 2003). Nevertheless, several nonprofit
organizations did not perceive any potential external influence. One nonprofit social
service director indicated that they are sensitive about how they present information to
the general public, but "our underlying beliefs will not be influenced, just how we present
those beliefs" (Organization 9 2003). Another nonprofit public safety director stated that
the public does not have very much impact on his department and he added that the
public has a greater amount of impact upon public sector public safety organizations
(Organization 4 2003).
Private business organizations were less likely to perceive any influence
generated by the general public, the media, or other organizations, but 50 percent of the
businesses did (Figure 10). Two businesses expressed an extensive amount of
regulations applied to them by government agencies. A manager at a financial institution
stated that her organization faces extensive governmental regulation and that government
agencies come in and conduct audits of their technological department (Enterprise 8
2003). A cleaning service manager stated,
EPA, county, and state guidelines regulate how we operate. Due to guidelines
and tax issues as well as regulations such as insurance agencies and workman's
comp it inhibits the ability of the private business to perform. Tying our hands
behind our chairs hurts business (Enterprise 6 2003).
A private sector fuel provider indicated that his enterprise was also open to the public.
He added due to numerous customer complaints they became a smoke-free facility. "The
public has a voice" (Enterprise 20 2003). Other businesses did not perceive this type of
external influence. One fast food private business manager stated the only type of
influence he perceived was from vendors trying to sell them items based upon what other
businesses were doing such as offering different sizes of soft drink cups (Enterprise 20
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2003). A retail sales manager stated her business is not really open to the influence of
others adding everything is mandated extensively by the corporate office even down to
the price of lumber, despite the local costs (Enterprise 16 2003).

Hypothesis 7
Public agencies will be significantly less likely to utilize monetary performance
incentives such as bonuses and merit-based pay raises than private enterprises and
marginally less likely to utilize these incentives than nonprofit organizations.

According to the data collected through these semi-structured interviews this
hypothesis is firmly supported. The data clearly indicate that public agencies are
significantly less likely to utilize monetary performance incentives than private sector
businesses and are also marginally less likely to use them than nonprofit organizations
(Figure 11 ). The data indicate that 95 percent of the private enterprises employ
monetary performance incentives compared to only 20 percent of the public agencies and
30 percent of the nonprofit organizations. For the purposes of this thesis, monetary
performance incentives include bonuses for exemplary performance or the completion of
certain tasks as well as annual pay raises based on performance evaluations.
The Percentage of Organizations That Utilize Monetary
Performance Incentives
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The private businesses within this study were almost unanimous in their
utilization of some sort of monetary performance incentives (Figure 11 ). A sales manager
for an automobile retail sales organization said that their employees are paid according to
commission and bonuses are given for the sales of older vehicles (Enterprise 1 2002). A
manager of a grocery-retail sales organization stated they give a maximum of two payraises a year to employees for exemplary service and they also have stakeholder bonuses
based upon the profitability of the store (Enterprise 2 2002). A manager for a financial
institution said "We have bonus incentives for hourly and salary employees the vice
presidents and senior presidents. We paid tons out to hourly employees last year"
(Enterprise 8 2003). A manager for a private utility asserted that they have performance
evaluations every 90 days in order to award and attract employees to the organization
(Enterprise 13 2003). One lone enterprise asserted they did not utilize monetary
performance incentives. The manager of this private public safety organization
responded to this inquiry, by simply stating "no" (Enterprise 11 2003).
Public agencies were much less likely than private businesses to employ monetary
performance incentives (Figure 11 ). A public sector manager stated that they could not
reward employees monetarily; adding raises are established through a negotiated contract
and no framework for performance bonuses exist (Agency 3 2002). A public sector
library director stated that her organization is constrained in giving pay raises, but they do
offer rewards that are not necessarily monetarily related such as gifts for a job well done
(Agency 8 2003). Another public sector manager stated that his organization did not
have monetary performance awards, but they did reward employees with bronze, silver,
or gold challenge coins for the completion of tasks or for exemplary performance
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(Agency 14 2003). Nevertheless, 20 percent of the public agencies did employ monetary
performance incentives. One of these agencies asserted they have a performance
appraisal system that could be connected to pay raises dependent upon the budget
(Agency 11 2003). Yet, another stated they did have the ability to reward employees for
exemplary performance, but this has not been done in a few years due to the poor
economy (Agency 19 2003). One agency out of the twenty interviewed had a genuine
opportunity to reward the members of their organization. The agency director in a public
health organization declared monetary awards "can happen anytime based upon
performance, but they usually occur once a year" (Agency 13 2003).
Nonprofit organizations were slightly more prone to utilize monetary incentives
for performance than public agencies, but they were also significantly less likely to use
them than private businesses (Figure 11 ). A director of a social service agency said
"Bonus situations are there and some employees may get increases in salary for
exemplary performance dependent upon the budget" (Organization 8 2003). Another
social service agency director said they give monetary awards based upon performance.
These awards could be given throughout the year, quarterly, or at the end of the year
dependent upon the precise job (Organization 12 2003). Nevertheless, 70 percent of the
nonprofit organizations did not employ this type of incentive. One nonprofit social
service manager stated, "We have not instituted merit pay raises or performance
incentives. Our pay is based upon the budget and board approval" (Organization 3 2003).
Another social service director expressed his concerns about the use of monetary
performance incentives in a nonprofit setting. He cautioned monetary performance
incentives could be dangerous due to a limited amount of financial resources in a
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nonprofit organization. He also argued this type of incentive is more applicable for a
large private enterprise than for a nonprofit social service (Organization 20 2003).

Managerial Perception of Differences
The final item of the questionnaire collected the professional opinions of public
agency directors, private enterprise managers, and nonprofit organization executive
directors. These professional managers were asked whether or not they believed any
substantial differences exist between the three organizational sectors. If these managers
perceived any differences, they were asked to provide an example of how the sectors
varied. Ninety-two percent of the responding managers believed public sector agencies
were different from private enterprises for a variety of reasons (Figure 12). Moreover, 85
percent of the respondents believed the public sector was different than the nonprofit
sector (Figure 13).
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Figure 13: Perceived Sector Differences (b) n = 41
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Ninety percent of the public agency directors agreed that public agencies were
significantly different than private businesses (Figure 14). Ten of the public agencies
addressed the differences between nonprofit organizations and public agencies and only
60 percent of those agency directors believed the public agency was significantly
different than the nonprofit organization. The director for a public health organization
described what he referred to as one big difference between private enterprise and a
public agency. "Government agencies should be service oriented. Private business needs
to be profit oriented. Private businesses need to ensure profit is there. You don't last long
if you do not make a profit" (Agency 13 2003). A municipal manager said that
significant differences exist within the governing boards of the three organizational
sectors. He stated that nonprofit governing boards are people who share common
interests with the nonprofit organization and those people are self-selected by the
organization. In government, the quality of leadership is less effective than nonprofit
organizations. Government boards are elected based upon popularity or agenda and the
government board members do not share the same agenda or motives as the other board
members or the public agency. He added private sector organizations exist to make a
profit. Their governing boards are the most efficient; they are primarily rubber stamps
for the chairman of the board (Agency 7 2003). A director of a public agency said he
could speak for hours about the sectoral differences. He stated, "Within private industry
people who are knowledgeable about the product are making the decisions that affect the
way you do business, but in government any dumb ass can get elected and affect how an
agency operates and how that agency gets funded" (Agency 11 2003).
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Percentage of Perceived Sectoral Differences According to the
Organizational Sector

100°/o
90°/o
80%
70%
60o/o
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
00/o

.,,
c
0

;::!

·c::s
ca

...a
0

....0
GI

a

sc

GI

I:?

GI
Q.

Different From the
Public Sector

Different from Private
Sector

Different from
Nonprofit Sector

• Public n = 20*

90%

60%

NIA

•Private n = 19-

NIA

91%

89%

a Nonprofit n = 20

95%

Figure 14: Sectoral Differences - Displayed according to the perceive
differences between their sector and the other two sectors. *n = 10 in the
comparison of the nonprofit sector. **n = 11 in the comparison of the nonprofit
sector.

Private sector managers predominantly believed public agencies and nonprofit
organizations were significantly different from private enterprises (Figure 14). Eightynine percent of the respondents mentioned differences between public agencies and
private businesses, while 91 percent of the respondents specified differences between the
private and nonprofit sector. A manager from a financial institution stated that definite
differences exist.

In government it is harder to stay above the technological curve, as they do not
spend as much on technology. They are handicapped by property taxes. Some
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governments do not have enough money other governments have enough. In
business, we are making money and we can spend it. Nonprofit organizations do
not have the funds they need. Probably tons of other differences (Enterprise 8
2003).

Another private sector manager indicated the biggest difference between the three sectors
is a problem of accountability. He stated,
Nonprofit and government people fall into positions where they never grow or do
anything. In the private sector if you do not grow or change you are dead. In the
field of public safety [within the public sector], there is no incentive to do more
than the status quo. There is no pressure to excel and perform within government
and nonprofit organizations (Enterprise 9 2003).
The differences between the three organizational sectors were also readily
apparent to the majority of the respondents from the nonprofit sector (Figure 14).
Ninety-five percent of these agencies believed that nonprofit organizations were
significantly different from government agencies and 90 percent opined their
organizations differ from profit seeking private enterprises. The president for a local
nonprofit chapter said the main difference between private business and nonprofit
organizations is the emphasis on profit. "In private business, profit is what they are all
about" (Organization 2 2003). Another nonprofit organization director also saw the
profit motive of the private enterprise as a key difference and she also declared that
public agencies operate under a different process. "It is difficult to change within
government more so than the private sector. Private sectors can stay up with the times,
but the government sector is less apt to stay up with the times. They are less innovative
and a bulkier ship to navigate" (Organization 3 2003).
Hence, the overwhelming majority of the interviewed managers identified
significant differences that exist between the public, private and nonprofit sectors. The
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differences observed by these professional managers varied, but there were some
common elemental differences identified. The public sector was identified as a sector
that had a broad scope of clientele, a sector that is very open to public influence, a sector
that is more constrained by regulations and procedures, and a sector that is less
innovative. The private sector was described as a sector that was more flexible and
innovative as well as a sector primarily driven by the bottom line goal of profit.
Nonprofit organizations were described, as a sector that is less professional, possesses
fewer levels of bureaucracy, quicker to respond, and an organization that does not strive
to make a profit.

Conclusion
These findings clearly indicate that two of the hypothesized relationships were not
supported by the collected data, but five of the hypothesized relationships were present
and one hypothesized relationship was partially present (Table 1). Hence, these findings
suggest that prevalent differences exist between private enterprises, nonprofit
organizations, and public agencies. Differences between organizational goals, the
formalization of personnel processes and procedures, the formalization in the
organization, procurement and program decision making authority, organizational
openness, and the propensity to utilize monetary performance incentives were all clearly
indicated by the collected data.
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Strong Support

Support

Partial Support

No Support

Hl: Org Goals
H2: Org Values
H3: Personnel
Formalization
H4: Managerial
Risk Taking
H5: Formalized
Procedures
H6 (a): External
Approval
H6 (b): Openness
H7: Performance
Incentives

Table 1 Summation of Hypothesis Support
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Chapter 3
Local Government is Different
Analysis of Findings
The findings produced by these elite interviews illuminate the similarities and
differences between the three organizational sectors at the local level of the organization.
This analysis provides rich in-depth data that indicate public agencies, private enterprises,
and nonprofit organizations are fundamentally different at the local level of the
organization. These findings indicate that some differences between federal agencies and
large corporations are also prevalent at the local organizational level, but some of the
differences were not as apparent. Hence, the data support the core differences approach in
many organizational aspects, but also supports the generic management approach in a
few of the analyzed organizational characteristics.

H: 1 Organizational Goals
The findings clearly indicate that the predominant goal of the organization varies
between the three organizational sectors. Bozeman referred to this as one of the most
elementary differences popularly indicated in the comparative organizational literature
(Bozeman, 1987). Despite the elementary nature of this organizational characteristic, the
primary goal of the organization is a fundamental feature that illuminates the foundation
of every organization. In fact, the primary goal of the organization symbolizes the
primary reason of existence for each organization. This exposed difference clearly
indicates that the organizational sectors are fundamentally different at the local level of
the organization-similar to the differences exposed between large corporations and
federal level public agencies (Wilson 1989).
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The variance between the primary organizational goals of local organizations
supports the core differences approach to the comparative debate (Allison 1980; Appleby
1945). These three organizational sectors are distinctively different when it comes to the
fundamental purpose of their respective organizations. Hence, this finding does not
support a continuum of difference between the three organizational sectors, and it does
not support the generic management approach. Clearly, the primary goal of the
organization is fundamental to the operation of the organization as well as the proper
management of the organization. Hence, the variation between organizational goals
strongly supports the core differences approach, and this illuminated difference is an
important organizational characteristic.
Similar to the analysis of federal agencies (Brealey, Cooper, and Habib 1997;
Fottler 1981 ), the predominant goal of local private sector enterprise is to make a profit.
However, some of the organizations indicated their predominant goal was to provide
effective customer service in order to ensure a return visit to their businesses. It can be
logically concluded that these return visits would not be desired to enjoy the company of
the customer, but to generate a strong customer base to ensure future business and profits.
Hence, this author strongly argues that all of the private businesses interviewed within
this study are focused predominantly on making a profit.
In contrast, the public agency primarily exists to serve the public. The scholarly
literature suggests that the public does not want a public agency to generate a profit by
providing a public service (Wilson 1989). Hence, it appears that the public does not want
the profit seeking entrepreneurial mentality of the private sector to permeate the service
driven mentality of the public sector.
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Nevertheless, Murray (1975) challenges the lack of profit seeking in the public
sector, as he perceived a strong push for efficient service within government. Murray
proposed the drive to be efficient in order to be more cost effective was closely related to
the push for profit. Hence, does the goal of providing efficient service in government
equate to the goal of providing profit-generating service within the private sector? At no
point in any of the interviews was this hypothesized relationship supported. In contrast,
one private business manager observed the push to become more efficient or cost
effective as indicated by Murray, but he did not relate this change to a desire for
government agencies to generate a profit. Rather, he saw this drive to become more
efficient and effective as a means to better utilize the taxpayers' money in the provision
of service (Enterprise 13 2003).
Hence, the different primary organizational goals illuminated at the local
organizational level mimic the differences popularly referred to in the analysis of large
corporations and federal agencies. The bottom line of private enterprise is popularly
referred to as profit in the analysis of large corporations, and this analysis also identified
profit as the primary goal of local level enterprises. Thus, the monumental difference
between the primary organizational goals at the federal level is also overwhelmingly
present at the local level of organizations.

H: 2 Organizational Values
This analysis did not illuminate any notable differences in the importance of
values between the three organizational sectors. Moreover, this finding does not support
the core differences approach; rather, it promotes the generic management approach
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(Parker and Subramaniam 1964). The values evaluated in this study were efficiency,
effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability. While additional values such as
fairness, productivity, and equity exist, the importance of the values compared in this
study were commonly demonstrated in the scholarly literature (Bozeman 2002;
Golembiewski 1985). This study indicates the values that guide the decisions and output
of each organizational sector at the local level of analysis are virtually the same despite
the sector. Hence, the generic management approach, which suggests management is the
same despite the organizational sector, is supported by the similarities in organizational
values depicted in this analysis of the local level organizations.
The comparative analysis of federal level organizations overwhelmingly dictates
the predominant importance of efficiency in the private sector (Allison 1980; Wilson
1989) and the need for public agencies to become more efficient and businesslike
(Seidenstat 96). Nevertheless, the data accumulated by this research do not indicate that
the value of efficiency is the most important organizational value for any of the
organizational sectors within the local level of analysis. In fact, the organizational value
of efficiency was seen as the least important value out of the four available choices
presented to the organizational managers of all three sectors. Ironically, the private
sector was the only sector in the study where no manager rated the organizational value
of efficiency as the most important for his or her organization. This is a prominent
deviation from the federal level comparative studies.
Moreover, the value of responsiveness was considered to be an important
organizational value in public agencies. Rainey (1997) indicated that public agencies
were different from private enterprises in many ways, and one of these ways was the
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unique expectation of public agencies to be fair, honest, responsive, open and
accountable. Wilson (1989) stated the value of responsiveness was one organizational
value that affected the public sector more than the private sector. He defined this value
as "Reacting reasonably to the special needs and circumstances of particular people"
(Wilson 1989, 315). Wilson went on to say "inefficiency was a small price to pay for
freedom and responsiveness" (Wilson 1989, 326). The value of responsiveness was
discovered to be important in all three local organizational sectors. However, it was
determined to be the most important in only the private sector at the local level of
analysis. It is noteworthy to mention that the preference of responsiveness by local level
private enterprises is fundamentally different from the organizational value of efficiency
preferred by large corporations (Wilson 1989).
The value of accountability (Bozeman 2002) was also preferred to the value of
efficiency by all three sectors at the local level of analysis. This partially agrees with
Bozeman's findings as he proposed public agencies prefer the value of accountability to
efficiency. Nevertheless, it appears from this study that all three sectors at the local level
of analysis preferred the value of accountability to efficiency. In contrast, Kearns (1994)
argued that nonprofit organizations are not as adept with the value of accountability as
public agencies, but according to the statistical data nonprofit organizations rate the
importance of accountability virtually the same as public agencies.
The findings produced by this analysis raise a series of questions. First, does the
preference of responsiveness demonstrated by the private sector only relate to the desire
to make a profit, by highlighting the need to be responsive to customer demands?
Moreover, is the desire of government agencies and nonprofit organizations to be
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effective only a product of the reinvention of government movement or privatization that
stresses habitual public agency ineffectiveness? Finally, why was the heralded value of
efficiency considered the least important in local level organizations, when this value has
been frequently emphasized in recent government reform literature (Gore 1993; Savas
1987)?

H: 3 Personnel Procedure Formalization
The personnel procedures employed in local organizations decisively support the
core differences approach in the comparative organizational debate. This analysis clearly
indicates that local public agencies are more formalized in their hiring and promotion
processes and procedures than both the local level nonprofit and private sector
organizations. In addition, the propensity for public agencies to rarely terminate an
employee also creates a notable difference between the organizational sectors.
Similar to the formalized procedures employed in the federal public agencies
(Bozeman 1987; Scott and Falcone 1998), a large majority of public agencies within the
municipal, county, and local school district level utilized formalized processes in order to
hire an individual into the organization. Gore (1993) referred to the federal government's
formalized hiring process as inefficient. Nevertheless, perhaps there is a method behind
the madness, as the system utilized by many of the local government agencies is very
impressive and engineered to select the best applicant. This was not the case with a large
portion of the private businesses, as the employment interview this author witnessed
indicates (Enterprise 10, 2003). Hence, the hiring processes utilized within the public
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sector may not be deemed as efficient as the process used by the local restaurant
manager, but they would be considered more thorough and effective.
The promotion process in these three local organizational sectors is also very
different in formality. The public agencies within this study employed more formalized
promotion processes than the private enterprises and nonprofit organizations. Marsden,
Cook, and Kalleberg discovered a similar relationship in their statistical analysis of
organizations, "Bivariate regressions show that formalized promotion arrangements are
more common both in public organizations and in those that are subject to substantial
regulation" (Marsden, cook, and Kalleberg 1994). The promotion processes are explicitly
more formalized in public agencies, as they strive to ensure equity and effectiveness by
utilizing a process driven to select the most qualified for the position. Public agencies
consistently employed codified processes to promote employees, but this was not the case
in numerous nonprofit and private organizations. Many of the local level nonprofit and
private organizations promoted employees through a hiring procedure or simply
promoted employees based upon the perception they would excel within the position.
Hence, the most efficient method is practiced by the nonprofit organizations and private
enterprises, but the most effective and equitable method is utilized by public agencies.
The termination process employed by all three organizational sectors is highly
formalized. Thus, it appears that all three local organizational sectors assume they should
make sure they terminate an employee in a fair, effective, and equitable manner. Perhaps
if all three sectors utilized the same formality in the hiring process they would be more
akin to the public sector's infrequency of terminations. Remarkably 95 percent of the
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public agencies indicated that terminations do not happen or are extremely rare within
their organizations.
Concerning employee terminations in the public sector, Wilson (1989) indicated
that public managers desired the ability to hire employees and terminate employees at
their own discretion in order to replace incompetent workers with better ones. Moreover,
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argued it was difficult to terminate a government employee.
"Government workers are like headless nails: you can get them in, but you can't get them
out" (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, 126). This mimics the opinion shared by a few local
public agency managers in this analysis (Agency 5 2002).
Hence, it is evident that personnel processes are more formalized in public
agencies than private enterprises and nonprofit organizations at the local level of analysis.
These findings are similar to the identified differences in the analysis of federal level
organizations. Moreover, the formalized hiring and promotion processes within the
public sector appear more effective than the hiring and promotion processes utilized in
the private and nonprofit sector. It must be noted that some of the private enterprises and
nonprofit organizations also employed formalized processes especially in the hiring
procedures for their organizations, but these were not in an overwhelming majority. It
appears that the personnel processes utilized within public agencies have been created by
members outside of those organizations to ensure that they are very effective and not a
haphazard method that may take less time, money, and effort (Wilson 1989, 121).
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H: 4 Managerial Risk Taking
The analysis of managerial risk taking in local organizations supports the generic
management approach to this on-going debate. The public managers and nonprofit
organizational managers were both only marginally less apt to participate in managerial
risk taking than private enterprise managers. Thus, it appears the constraints described in
the literature that caused federal level public agencies to be less innovative were not as
prevalent within local public agencies. This managerial concept indicates that managers
from all three organizational sectors would be just as likely to employ innovative ideas
despite the sector.
The analysis of local level organizations did not decisively reflect the findings of
public sector managerial risk taking aversion at the federal level. Wilson (1989) observed
that government agency directors were more risk adverse than private enterprise
managers. "Government organizations are especially risk adverse since they are caught
up in a web of constraints" (Wilson 1989, 69). Nor did these findings strongly support
the previous analysis of local and state level public agencies. Moon (1999) discovered
that local and state level public agency directors were more risk adverse than private
enterprise managers. The findings produced in this analysis indicate that local public
agencies are slightly less apt to employ managerial risks than private enterprises, but the
public agencies could not legitimately be characterized as risk averse.
Bozeman (1987) indicated that public agency managers were more risk adverse
than private business managers, but he did indicate that past studies have produced
conflicting results. Similar to this local level analysis, in a later study, Bozeman and
Kingsley (1998) discovered that public managers were not more risk adverse than private
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enterprise managers. Instead Bozeman and Kingsley emphasized that reluctant managers
exist in both the private sector and the public sector. The findings of Bozeman and
Kingsley are mimicked by the findings of this analysis, as all three organizational sectors
contained organizational managers that were risk averse.
This study predicted that public agency managers would be substantially more
risk adverse than private sector managers. Clearly, the results of this analysis do not
strongly support the hypothesized relationship. Rather, the findings indicate that
managerial risk taking was an important managerial principle in the majority of local
public agencies. Interesting enough, it appears the nonprofit sector mimics the attitudes
expressed by the public sector, as they perceive the importance of innovation and
managerial risk taking. Hence, it is very interesting to note that none of the organizational
sectors appeared drastically more risk averse than the other.

H: 5 Organizational Formalization (Red Tape)
The presence of red tape in each of the organizational sectors also supports the
generic management approach. The majority of each organizational sector at the local
level of analysis clearly possessed formalized rules and procedures that directed the dayto-day activities of the organizational employee. Thus, the transference of managerial
practices from one organizational sector to another would not be drastically complicated
by the presence of red tape. However, similar to the analysis of federal organizations, the
local level public agencies were more apt to possess formalized rules or procedures.
The presence of red tape within federal public agencies is an instrumental
difference commonly referred to in the organizational comparative analysis (Moon 1999;
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Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976). In addition, the reinvention movement has pointedly
argued that public agencies were prone to red tape and pointedly attacked formalized
rules that constrain the ability of public agencies to function effectively (Gore 1993).
Likewise, the analysis of local organizations indicate public agencies employ more
regulations and procedures to govern the day-to-day operations of the employee than
either the private enterprise or the nonprofit organization. Nevertheless, the findings of
this research do not indicate that local private enterprises and local nonprofit
organizations are completely free of formalized processes and procedures that guide their
respective organizations. Hence, the concept of red tape is not stringently reserved for
only public agencies. For example, two local private enterprise managers made explicit
reference to thick binders that governed the daily operation of their organizations. This
mimicked a finding in the literature regarding formality within the public sector. "The
manuals for each section were multi-volume sets of detailed instructions on all aspects of
administration" (Kaufman 1981, 109).
The amount of organizational formalization discovered in the local public sector
differs from both the private sector and the nonprofit sector. These findings decisively
support the scholarly position that indicates public agencies are more formalized than
private enterprises. "Public bureaucracies have more SOP's than private due to
managerial problems that arise out of politically enforceable constraints asserted by
external constituents" (Wilson 1989, 133). The finding of this research also contradicts
the findings proposed by Buchanan (1975) and Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman (1995).
Buchanan asserted, contrary to previous organizational research, that private businesses
were more formalized within their respective organizations than public agencies. This
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thesis affirms that a substantial proportion of private enterprises are governed by red tape
in their respective organizations, but procedural formalization is more prevalent within
local public agencies.
In addition, a majority of nonprofit organizations were also very formalized in
their day-to-day operations. However, the amount of formalization practiced in these
organizations did not appear to be as salient to the nonprofit organizational directors as
the amount of red tape they observed in public agencies. Similar to the findings of
Clarke (2001 ), despite their own formalization, several nonprofit organizational directors
perceived government agencies as more formalized and more bureaucratic than their own
organizations. "To many, the contribution of nonprofit organizations to the adaptiveness
of the political system is axiomatic: the flexibility and adaptiveness of the nonbureaucratic nonprofit sector is presumed to be one of its many virtues" (Clarke 2001,
133). Nevertheless, a majority of these organizations possessed very formalized rules and
procedures responsible for guiding the day-to-day operations of the organizational
employee. Thus, the transference of public agency functions to the nonprofit sector
through the process of privatization in order to circumvent excessive formalization is
unsettling.

H: 6(a) and 6(b) Organizational Decision Making Authority and Openness
The comparison regarding the degree of organizational openness and the necessity
to receive external approval to make organizational decisions support the core differences
approach in the organizational comparative literature. Moreover the analysis of local
organizations concur with the literature that argues public agencies are more open and
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accountable to entities external to their organization than private enterprises (Appleby
1945; Kaufman 1981). In addition, the analysis of local organizations supports the
anecdotal observations made by the practitioners in federal agencies who proclaimed
public agencies are more open and susceptible to external forces (Blumenthal 1979).
Hence, the external relationships discovered at the municipal, county, and local school
district level were congruent with the environmental relationships affecting federal
agencies and large private enterprises.
The findings of this analysis strongly confirmed the findings of Kaufman (1981)
and Wilson (1989) as those scholars indicated a large amount of external oversight that
constrained and governed federal agencies. All but two public agencies in this study
were required to consult with an external political official, committee, or legislative
council prior to making a substantial purchase within their organization. This was
substantially different from a private sector business, but it was also necessary for several
of the private businesses to confer with an entity external to their local organization prior
to making a substantial purchase.
The necessity to contact an external entity prior to making a programming
decision was also evident at the local level of government. This finding was not as strong
as the scholarly literature predicted, but it most be noted that this study separated the
issue of cost from the issue of program planning. This was important since purchasing
was analyzed as a separate portion of this study, but not very practical since
organizational programming also involves the calculation of cost. Thus, these findings
indicate the decisions to plan or implement a program in a local agency requires the
approval of an external entity regardless of cost. Rainey, Backoff, and Levine (1976)
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referred to this as a requirement to receive support from constituents, interests, and
various authorities. "One effect of these constraints is that public managers have less
choice as to entry and withdrawal from various undertakings" (Rainey, Backoff, and
Levine 1976, 238).
The extent of external approval required by nonprofit organizations to make
programming and purchasing decisions was not evident in the comparative literature. It
is readily apparent that local public agencies and local nonprofit organizations are well
regulated in the purchasing and programming managerial functions. The stronger
reliance upon external approval in the programming aspect of nonprofit organizations
compared to public agencies was not suspected. Moreover, ifthe procedures that guide
the purchasing decisions and programming decisions within nonprofit organizations are
remarkably similar to the environmental forces that affect public agencies, how much
impact does this have on the perception that nonprofit organizations are less
bureaucratic? The analysis of local organizations clearly indicate the drive to privatize
government functions by transferring these functions to the nonprofit sector does not
necessarily mean these functions will be delivered in a more efficient and less
bureaucratized process.
The openness of the municipal, county level, and local school district agencies is
remarkably different from private sector enterprises at the local level of their businesses.
While some private businesses demonstrated that they were open to external influence,
the overwhelming degree of openness demonstrated by the local public agencies was
substantially greater. This finding dramatically supports the scholarly literature that
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observed a vast amount of external influence in the larger federal agencies as compared
to large corporations.
Relationships between bureau chiefs and constituents within the political, social,
and administrative environment consisted largely of efforts on each side to get the
other side to do what it wanted. External clusters constantly told the chief what
the bureaus should do and they employed every means from threats to cajolery to
impress their respective preferences on the bureaus (Kaufman 1981, 4 7).

Golembiewski (1985) described public organization decisions as far more visible than
decisions made within the private sector and the public agency as an organization that is
exposed to multiple accesses from a multitude of advisors. This is remarkably similar to
the observation of a local municipal administrator who perceived public management as
working in a fishbowl (Agency 7 2003).
The openness of local level public agencies illuminates an important
organizational characteristic. The public agency's constituents, the media, and other
organizations have the opportunity to influence the agency more than the customers of a
private enterprise or nonprofit organization. The openness of these public agencies
demonstrates that they are interested, if not required, to at least listen to the needs of the
public. Moreover, public agencies provide various avenues for the public to voice their
concerns such as open meetings, accessibility to the public as well as the media, and local
elections.

H: 7 Monetary Performance Incentives
The opportunity for organizations to utilize monetary performance incentives
substantially supports the core differences approach. This finding decisively agrees with
the findings produced by the analysis of federal level agencies (Rainey 1997). Unlike
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local private enterprises, the majority of local public agencies did not employ this form of
employee motivation. Moreover, local nonprofit organizations were also less likely to
provide monetary performance incentives. Hence, this core difference resonates
throughout the three organizational sectors.
Gore's (1993) push for the utilization of monetary performance incentives in the
federal government clearly demonstrates a lack of monetary performance incentives
within the federal bureaucracy. Likewise, this analysis demonstrates that monetary
performance incentives have not been universally adopted at the local government level.
Unlike the local private sector enterprises, where monetary rewards were extremely
commonplace throughout the organization, the utilization of monetary performance
incentives in the public sector were mainly reserved for upper administrative positions.
This finding corresponded with numerous scholarly findings. Fottler (1991) and
Rainey (1997) characterized the ability of public agencies to utilize monetary
performance incentives as very constrained. They also cited a weaker relationship
between performance and extrinsic rewards within public agencies. Wilson (1989) also
discovered challenges government agencies face in their attempts to monetarily reward
employees due to contractual limitations. "Government management and constraints
make it almost impossible to design a contract basing compensation on employee
performance" (Wilson 1989, 156). Hence, the scholarly finding produced predominantly
by analyzing federal agencies concurs with the result produced by the analysis of local
government agencies.
The nonprofit organizations in this study were also not very likely to utilize
monetary performance incentives, but they still utilized this form of motivation more than
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public agencies. Nevertheless, this difference was not substantial. Thus, the nonprofit
organization's utilization of monetary performance incentives strongly supports the
findings of Gray (1998) who said that public agencies were not capable of providing
monetary performance incentives. This was similar to the opinion of one nonprofit
organizational manager, as he did not see monetary performance incentives as ethically
applicable to nonprofit organizations that are attempting to raise funds to serve their
clients (Organization 20 2003).
Hence, the utilization of monetary performance incentives in the public sector and
the nonprofit sector was dramatically different than the prevalent use of these incentives
within the private sector even at the local organizational level. The ultimate obstacle that
stands in the way of providing monetary performance incentives in the public sector
appears to be related to contractual constraints. The utilization of performance incentives
would have to be approved by the elected representatives of the community through the
contract negotiating process, not just the organizational director who might perceive
potential advantages in the utilization of performance incentives.

Managerial Perception
The opinions of the practicing managers from all three organizational sectors
dramatically indicate that distinct differences exist. Thus, the managers that perform
their duties in public, private, or nonprofit organizations on a day-to-day basis observed
differences between the three sectors. The opinions of these managers decisively concur
with the opinions of managers that have managed in federal agencies and large private
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corporations (Allison 1980). The distinct differences observed by the organizational
managers at the local organizational level also support the core differences approach.

Conclusion
The analysis of the local government agencies, private for-profit enterprises, and
nonprofit organizations clearly indicate that all three of these organizational sectors are
inherently different. A majority of the scholarly comparative literature has identified
several differences and similarities between federal governmental agencies and large
corporations. Likewise, the majority of the results of this local analysis concurred with
those discovered in the analysis of federal agencies. The findings that did not concur
were related to the perception of organizational values and the propensity of
organizations to take managerial risks. Nevertheless, the scholarly literature offers
substantial arguments that indicate federal agencies are different than large private
businesses. This research indicates that local government agencies are also different
from local private businesses. In addition, public agencies and private for-profit agencies
are also substantially different from nonprofit organizations.
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Chapter 4
Apples, Oranges, and Grapefruit
Summary
The differences and similarities between public agencies and private businesses
are often debated within the scholarly literature (Allison 1980; Baldwin 1987; Buchanan
1975; Parker and Subramaniam 1964; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976). The majority
of these authors debate whether or not the management principles are similar or different
between the private for profit sector and the public or governmental sector. Some authors
argue that the often-mentioned differences are not significant and a generic form of
management could be practiced despite the organization's sector (Baldwin 1987; Parker
and Subramaniam 1964). Yet, other authors argue that the sectoral classification of
public is not significant. These scholars argue that instead of distinct lines of division a
matter of publicness only separates the organizational sectors and all that organizations
are public to a certain degree (Bozeman 1987). Other authors argue that distinct
differences exist (Allison 1980; Rainey, Backoff, and Levine 1976). The findings of this
thesis support the core differences approach.
The comparative literature indicates several notable organizational differences
between private businesses and government agencies. This analysis focused on seven of
the most notable differences. These differences were the goals of the organization,
organizational values, personnel procedures, managerial risk taking, organizational
formalization, organizational environment, and monetary performance incentives. In
addition, the practitioners' own professional opinions were analyzed in order to
determine if the managers perceived any significant differences between government
agencies, private enterprises, and nonprofit organizations.
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This research made two significant contributions to the comparative literature.
First, this study focused on organizational similarities and differences at the local
organizational level. Second, this thesis also analyzed the differences and similarities of
local level private-nonprofit organizations. A majority of the comparative literature
primarily analyzed large federal government agencies and large corporations. Hence, this
study contributes to the scholarly literature by analyzing local level organizations
including nonprofit organizations.
In order to determine the differences and similarities of local public agencies,

private enterprises, and nonprofit organizations, sixty semi-structured interviews were
conducted over a three-month period. Twenty organizational managers, directors, and
executive directors were interviewed from each organizational sector. During these
interviews, each respondent was asked to respond to the same ten questions.
According to the findings, organizational goals, the formalization in personnel
processes, the formalization of organizational procedures, the necessity to seek external
approval to make purchases and programming decisions, the openness of the
organization, and the utilization of monetary performance incentives are all different
between local public agencies, private businesses, and nonprofit organizations. The
managerial risk taking aspect of organizations was also different, but not as strong as the
hypothesized relationship predicted. The values of the organizations appear to be
virtually the same.
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Research Implications

It is evident differences exist at the local level of organizations between the
public, private, and nonprofit sector. However, similarities also exist, and these
similarities are not only in the unimportant aspects of government (Allison 1980).
Hence, the analogy presented in the title of this thesis depicts three fruits that are similar,
yet different. The similarities of these three fruits are not enough to make the fruits the
same, nor are the differences enough to make all three fruits completely different.
Nevertheless, the differences between the three fruits are distinctive. Likewise, these
three organizational sectors are similar, but the similarities do not make these three
organizational sectors the same. It is the sectoral differences such as the goals of the
organization and the openness of the organizations that make all three of these
organizational sectors inherently different.
The fundamental differences identified in this analysis present major obstacles in
the recent government reform efforts of privatization and reinvention (Alford 2002;
Carroll 1995; Moe and Gilmour 1995; Sullivan 1987). First, the goals of the
organizations are convincingly different between organizational sectors. Thus, the
primary driving force for the organizational sectors is strikingly different. In sports, the
goals of a football team vary from the goals of a basketball team. Similar to
organizational sectors, the teams have common features such as uniforms, the use of a
ball, and the need to produce points. However, basketball players are concerned with
shooting field goals or getting the ball through a basket ten-feet overhead, while football
players are concerned with getting the ball past a goal line for a touchdown. In fact,
football players would rather get a touchdown than a field goal, which in the case of
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football implies kicking a ball through the uprights located at the back of the end zone for
three points. Hence, just as a basketball team would have to change the goals of their
organization to be successful on the football field, a public agency, nonprofit
organization, and private enterprise would have to modify their essential goals to succeed
in a different sector. The primary goal of an organization represents the primary reason
an organization exists, and this is not a moot characteristic that can be easily avoided en
route to government reform.

If an organization exists to serve the general public, then that is what the
organization is designed to accomplish. On the other hand, if an organization exists in
order to ensure a reasonable economic return for the organization's stakeholders in the
form of profit, then that is what the organization must prepare itself to achieve. Just as a
football team will approach its goal differently than a basketball team. A public agency
will have to approach the delivery of public services differently than a private enterprise
that is attempting to ensure a profit. Thus, the driving force of the organization must be
considered prior to transferring the duties of the organization from one organizational
sector to another through the process of privatization. Likewise, the primary goal of the
organization should be considered prior to transferring the concepts from one
organizational sector to another through the process of reinvention. Clearly, the use of
five team members instead of eleven would be more cost-effective for the organization's
general manager in the delivery of services on the football field, but five players would
not be very successful in making a touchdown against the opposing eleven defensive
players.
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Second, the openness that public agencies endure is an organizational aspect that
could severely hamper the employment of entrepreneurial principles in a public agency
(Appleby 1945). A majority of decisions made at the local level of public agencies are
open to the influence of the media and the general public. This striking sectoral
difference must be considered prior to employing governmental reform efforts that
indicate private business techniques would be more effective than the methods employed
by public agencies. Just as practitioners have noted (Ross 1998; Rumsfeld 1979), it is
imperative to realize public agency openness was not created to simply inhibit efficiency
or to make the job of the public director more difficult; rather, the openness of a public
agency was establish to ensure accountability in the pursuit of the publics' affairs. In
contrast, private sector enterprises are not as open and are less accountable to the public.
Nevertheless, they are held partially accountable through the form of government
regulation instituted on behalf of the general public, but even this small fraction of
oversight frustrates private enterprises (Enterprise 6 2003; Rumsfeld 1979).
Third, the personnel procedures of government agencies appear more effective
than those utilized within several private enterprises. The reinvention literature is
resplendent with references to inept public personnel procedures (Gore 1993). However,
the advocates of reinvention do not illuminate the shallow personnel procedures
employed by some private sector businesses, which this analysis of local enterprises has
exposed. It is apparent that public agency personnel procedures are generally more
formalized than private enterprise personnel procedures. However, this formalization
does not imply these procedures are inherently less effective. In contrast, the procedures
of public agencies are employed to ensure fairness, and to select the best candidate for the
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job or promotion. Hence, the analysis of local organizations questions the rationale
behind the reinvention of public agency personnel systems. Do Americans want to
sacrifice effectiveness at the expense of becoming less formalized or presumably more
efficient?
The differences and similarities demonstrated by the nonprofit organizational
sector also produce interesting findings. The amount of procedural formalization in
nonprofit organizations as well as the requirement to obtain external approval to make
programming decisions damages the preconceived concept that nonprofit organizations
are free of red tape. The formalization nonprofit organizations have to endure should not
be considered moot, in the pursuit of organizational efficiency. The transference of public
agency business to nonprofit organizations in order to efficiently deliver a public service
is not necessarily that prudent (Choudhury and Ahmed 2002; Jackson, Elmoore, and Hula
2001; O'Connell 1996).
Efficiency, efficiency, where art thou efficiency? Efficiency has been referred to
as a stalwart managerial value in the private and public sector. However, none of the
organizational sectors valued efficiency higher in importance than effectiveness,
responsiveness, or accountability. Rather, the value of efficiency was perceived as the
least important by all of the organizational sectors. This was definitely not expected
since the government reform literature emphasizes the importance of efficiency and the
need for public agencies to become efficient like the private sector (Savas 1987). In his
explanation of privatization Savas stated, "In a world of finite resources, efficiency is
also an important societal goal. We should extract the maximum from each ton of raw
material and from each hour of work" (Savas 1987, 7). However, the private sector did
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not perceive efficiency as that important, and neither did any other sector. The question
that has to be asked is whether or not these findings are an anomaly created by the
questionnaire instrument, or if the value of efficiency is simply overrated in the pursuit of
government reform (Frederickson 1996)?
The opinions of the managers in each organizational sector convincingly concur
with the findings of Allison (1980) and Rainey (1981) as they fervently indicate that the
three organizational sectors are inherently different. The testimony of these managers
must be considered as a prominent factor in the comparative organizational debate.
These managers observed differences between organizational sectors that included the
seven organizational characteristics this thesis measured as well as differences that this
thesis did not analyze. Thus, the experiences and perceptions of these organizational
managers predominantly indicate that distinct sectoral differences do exist. These
observed differences strongly suggest that public, private, and nonprofit organizations
cannot be managed generically (Fottler 1991; Ross 1998). Thus, to properly manage
within each sector, a manager must adapt to the organizational sector and the inherent
differences therein, rather than expecting the organizational sector to adapt to a generic
model preferred by the organizational manager.

Future Research
During this study, some interesting ideas for future research became apparent.
First, the analysis of organizational values utilized in this study was the most challenging
question for the respondents to answer. This question was also the only question that did
not produce any separation between the three sectors. A study could be conducted that
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analyzed the organizational values of organizations from the three sectors by utilizing a
series of close-ended thermometer or feeling statements. Perhaps, presenting a series of
value-laden statements would create a more objective appraisal of the organization's
values, as compared to a ranking method utilized in this research.
Second, one of the public safety organizational directors prompted a research idea
by stating that private business ambulance services were now on the decline. He added
that emergency medical services were not profitable and the deliveries of these services
are slowly returning back to the public sector (Agency 12 2003). This hypothesis would
provide a valuable organizational comparative study. Not only could the private and
public ambulance services be analyzed, as was done within the confmes of this study,
rural volunteer ambulance organizations could be analyzed as well. The analysis of all
three sectors in a larger proportion would present interesting findings that could
contribute to the comparative literature. Two strengths would be evident. First, it would
compare organizations from all three organizational sectors that possess a similar
function. Second, the study by its nature would require a larger geographical area to
develop a suitable sampling frame.
Third, future research could be conducted by analyzing private, public, and
nonprofit utilities in a larger geographic area. This study would compare a broader scope
than comparing only ambulance services, as trash service, telephone service, water
service, sewer service, and electrical services could be analyzed. This research could
produce valuable data and make a wonderful contribution to the comparative literature.
Nevertheless, one major weakness would be the necessity to travel large distances to
collect the data.
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The method of observation could also be employed to study the differences and
similarities between the organizational sectors at the local organizational level. This
study would take an extensive amount of time, but the study would produce valuable and
reliable data. Observing the public, private, and nonprofit organizational managers
manage their respective organizations over a long period of time would produce
wonderful data that could not be garnered by simply interviewing the managers.
Observing the managers over a lengthy period of time could also reduce the potential
damaging effects notarized by the Hawthorne Experiment (Welch and Comer 2001 ).
Despite the strengths of this study, this study would require a large amount of time and
the expenses of life would have to be offset by receiving monetary assistance.
The last example of future research seems to generate the most remarkable
possibilities. This thesis was composed of 60 organizations from one county, three
school districts, and four municipalities. However, the small amount of organizations
involved in the study creates the major weakness of this research. To overcome this
weakness, it would be necessary to expand the geographical nature of this study. Future
research could analyze organizations from several different communities, in order to
increase the sampling frame to a legitimate statistical sampling size. However, it is
imperative to maintain the semi-structured interview method utilized in this study in
order to ensure the richness of the data would not be sacrificed. Thus, this research study
would take a substantial length of time to conduct and the travel expenses would
definitely become a formidable factor.

Apples, Oranges, and Grapefruit 104
Conclusion
The quest of this research was to determine if any substantial differences exist
between the private, nonprofit, and public organizational sectors at the local
organizational level. The analysis of sixty local organizations supports the core
differences approach as it firmly indicates that distinct sectoral differences exist.
Moreover, these differences exist in organizational features that can substantially inhibit
the popular government reform efforts of reinvention and privatization. Perhaps society
should realize what Appleby affirmed over fifty years ago, that government is simply
different (Appleby, 1945, 122).
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Appendix 1
Thesis Questionnaire
All personal names, organizational names, and organization locality will be held in strict confidence.
2) Position I Length in Office:
4) Organizational Type/Sector:

I) Name:
3) Organizational Size:
I)

What is your organization's most important goal?

2)

Considering the following organizational values, how does your organization rate them in
importance on a scale of one to four, with one being the most important and four representing the
least important.
Efficiency

3)

Responsiveness

Effectiveness

Accountability

Considering personnel, could you briefly explain your organization's hiring, promotion, and
termination processes and procedures?
*Prompt*--Could anyone outside of your organization influence personnel decisions? If yes,
could you please explain?
*Prompt-What is your organizations attitude toward terminating an employee?

4) Does your organization utilize monetary performance incentives to reward employees for
exemplary performance? For example, a pay raise or cash bonuses for completed tasks. If yes,
could you briefly explain the process?
5) If an organizational manager wanted to purchase new equipment that is significant in cost, what
would be the normal process or procedure to accomplish the task?
*Prompt-Would anyone outside of the organization have to be consulted? If yes, could you
please explain?
6) If an organizational manager wanted to initiate a new organizational program that could
dramatically impact the organization, what would be the normal process or procedure to
accomplish this task?
*Prompt-Would anyone outside of the organization have to be consulted?
7)

Does any other organization, the media, or the public attempt to influence the decisions made
within your organization or the policies and procedures of your organization? If yes, could you
please explain?

8) Does your organization require employees to perform their daily duties according to established
rules and procedures? For example, according to an office procedures handbook. If yes, could
you please explain?
9)

What is your organization's attitude toward innovation and managerial risk taking?

I 0) As a professional manager, do you believe any significant differences exist between government
agencies, private businesses, and nonprofit organizations?
Is there anything you would like to add that I have not thought to ask you about?
May I have your permission to contact you again, if further questions arise?
Note environment.
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Notes

i

In the analysis of organizational values, only the values of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and

responsiveness were analyzed. Hence, several important values were not analyzed. These organizational
values include, but are not limited to, fairness, equity, and productivity. The value of productivity was
intentionally not incorporated in this study due to the similarity of this value with effectiveness and the
common desire for organizations to consider productivity as important. The value of fairness was omitted
from this study due to the ranking of unimportance it received in a comparative study this author conducted
in the fall of2002 (Endnote ii). The value of equity was not utilized in this study in order to ensure the
respondents were not intimidated by the term. It was suspected that analysis of this value would generate
an alarming concern for the organizational managers regarding equal employment opportunity regulations
that might have biased the manager's response in order to appear politically correct. Moreover, the values
analyzed in this study are commonly referred to within the organizational management literature and
represent a fair continuum of values that affect every organization regardless of sector. Nevertheless, the
analysis of more organizational values would make a significant contribution to the comparative analysis of
local organizations and this could be conducted in future studies.

ii

Ten of these sixty elite interviews were completed in a study that was conducted in the fall of2002. This

study concentrated upon the differences and similarities between private enterprises and public agencies
within the local organizational level. The organizations incorporated in the study met the specific
guidelines for this study, as they were all from the same Midwestern County and they possessed ten or
more employees. In fact, this thesis is an expansion of this original study with only a few alterations. First,
the initial study did not incorporate nonprofit organizations or educational organizations. Second, the
original study surveyed the value of fairness instead of accountability. This value change was instituted as
an improvement to the original study, due to the significance of accountability within the scholarly
literature. Third, the original study did not explicitly ask about the organization's attitude about
terminating employees, but through the testimony of public managers this difference was illuminated.
Hence, this thesis explicitly measured the organization's propensity to terminate employees.
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iiiThis author attempted to call numerous organizations in order to secure sixty elite interviews for this
study. Several of the public organizations did not call this author back, despite numerous requests for an
interview. In addition, a few public organizational managers that were contacted also refused to be
interviewed claiming they were to busy. One municipal public agency director refused to be interviewed,
but did affirm he would complete the questions if they were mailed to his office. This author complied and
included a stamped and self-addressed envelope, but the director never returned the questionnaire despite a
follow up phone call to the director. Likewise, a few private enterprise managers refused to respond to this
author's request for an interview or simply refused to be interviewed. One private business would not even
let this author speak to the manager, as the employee argued her manager did not have time for an
interview. In contrast, the nonprofit organizational managers were very willing to be interviewed and even
returned this author's phone calls. Some of the nonprofit directors even commented about this, as they
stated nonprofit organizations love to talk about their organizations (Organization 10 2003). This
corresponds to the concept of organizational commitment referred to as the largest sectoral difference by
one nonprofit organizational director (Organization 20 2003). However, one nonprofit organizational
manager did agree to be interviewed, but never followed up as promised. Ironically, the most challenging
interview to get was with a nonprofit organizational manager who was concerned with the legitimacy of
this author's intentions.

